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My objective in this study is two-fold. First, I want to examine 
the decision-making operations of the Supreme Court in the 
period 1949-1969 by analyzing the reasons and votes in a se-
quence of related cases. Second, I want to present a critical re-
view of the doctrinal pattern which has emerged in Canadian law 
in the field in which I have chosen to assess the work of the court. 
The family of legal problems which I have singled out involve 
the various excuses to criminal conviction for prohibited conduct 
-defences which flow from the lack of mens rea, responsibility, 
or blameworthiness. Because these two interests may at times di-
verge, the article will frequently contain material which is extran-
eous to one or to the other. However, I feel that any such costs 
are outweighed by the intellectual gains which result from an ex-
amination at the same time of a developing substantive area of 
law and the workings of the institution which is chiefly respon-
sible for this development. 
In order to examine these different factors, we must have 
some set of ideal standards, both as to how the courts should 
operate and what kind of legal system should obtain here. Such a 
standard will furnish both a criterion for selecting the issues to be 
*Paul Weiler, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. 
This article is the first of a series of studies which I am writing on the 
contribution of the Supreme Court of Canada to the development of 
Canadian law since 1949. This continuing project has been financed by a 
grant from the Canada Council made to my colleagues, Dean Gerald Le 
Dain and Professor Sidney Peck, and myself. My two research assistants 
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background research. My research assistants in the summer of 1970, Paul 
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' There are three helpful general treatments of facets of the Canadian 
law of mens rea and the criminal law excuses: Ryan, The Necessity of Proof 
of Wrongful Intent in Criminal Cases (1961-62), 4 Crim. L.Q. 63; Mewett,
The Shifting Basis of Criminal Law (1963-64), 6 Crim. L.Q. 468; Bina-
vince, The Doctrine of Mens Rea in Canada, from The Fourth Inter-
national Symposium on Comparative Law (1966), p. 82. 
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discussed in this way and also a basis for assessing the court's 
methods and results. Studies of the kind I am engaging in here 
require that the investigator disclose clearly the values and ideals 
which he brings to bear on the issue under discussion in order 
to aid in the critical assessment of his own findings. I intend to go 
somewhat beyond this demand because my concern is not simply 
with understanding how the court has operated and why it has 
selected any particular approach. Just as important is to point 
the way towards and perhaps help in achieving better results. It 
is probably impossible to separate completely these two objectives 
in legal philosophy. 
As will become apparent in the study, the prevailing theory 
of judicial decision-making utilized by the Supreme Court is posi-
tivist. As is usually the case with a practical, action-oriented body, 
such a general philosophy is more or less tacit and unconscious. 
For this reason, it is probably even more effective in shaping the 
assumptions upon which the court operates. By legal positivism 
I mean a theory that individual cases should be decided by appeal 
to legal rules which are found in conventional legal sources and 
applied in accordance with their stated terms, without regard to 
their fitness for the purpose for which they are used. The sources 
can be statutory, judicial opinion, text-writer, and so on. In 
dealing with them the court tries to assess the authoritativeness 
of verbal statements which it finds and extracts. There is little or 
no attempt to assess or rework these statements in the light of the 
manifest purpose of the rule and the more basic values which the 
system is supposed to implement.2 
What is the alternative I suggest? 3 I assume that judges ought 
to play a collaborative role with the legislature, in developing the 
general policies to be implemented in the law. Because the judge 
is at the point of application of general rules, he may be the best 
reformer in certain kinds of situations. Yet, as a member of a 
collective body, the judiciary, one charged with administering a 
legal system, whose creation is the basic responsibility of a repre-
sentative legislature, he cannot be completely "free-wheeling". 
Hence, we need a general line of delineation between the legislative 
and judicial responsibilities for improving the quality of our legal 
order. 
I would suggest that legislatures are best capable of major 
reviews of the problems in a certain area, where the relevant, 
available expert knowledge is explored, a systematic programme 
2This is what judges who are conventionally termed "positivist" cus-
tomarily do. I would not at all suggest that such writers as Hart or Kelsen 
advocate the position described in this paragraph.
3 This is a bare sketch of the ideas and literature canvassed in Weiler, 
Two Models of Judicial Decision-makina (1968), 46 Can. Bar Rev. 406,
and Weiler, Legal Values and Judicial Decision-making (1970), 48 Can. 
Bar Rev. 1. 
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is implemented, compromises between important competing in-
terests are registered, the popular acceptability of the basic scheme 
is monitored, and sophisticated legal techniques for implementa-
tion are devised. Courts (or like bodies) are most competent at 
rationally developing the implications of a scheme of social policy 
already adopted for society (in our day, almost always by the 
legislature). Within this framework of legislated values, a court 
can protect the claims of fairness and equality by elaborating in a 
coherent way the demands of these values for concrete situations 
to which they are applicable. The court deals with problems in-
dividually, at retail as it were, with each competing interest having 
no more favourable position than the relevant principles deem 
proper. The results of impersonal unravelling of the established 
policies become available to individual litigants when they really 
need them, after they have already been hurt. 
It is obvious that the lines of judicial restraint suggested are 
not capable of precise, objective, and easily applicable statements. 
However, I believe there is a sufficient core of content that its 
honest acceptance by the courts would make a real difference in 
the scope of judicial action. And full occupation of their proper 
area of activity would have real benefits to society, both in the 
quality of judge-made law and the saving of legislative energy for 
more appropriate objects. 
Hence, while I agree with the positivist claim that the flow 
of judicial decisions must be channelled within certain established, 
impersonal, and relatively fixed points of reference, I would argue 
that the source of stability within the legal order flows from cer-
tain institutionally-accepted principles. Principles are general state-
ments of social purposes and standards which do not have specific 
application to individual cases, demanding one result rather than 
another. Instead they operate in conjunction with other principles 
to warrant the aptness of a new legal rule which is then applied 
to the facts to justify a concrete decision. 
Such principles have the added dimension of weight, some-
thing that follows from the fact that they do not logically require 
certain results. Principles do not contradict each other and be-
come overruled. Instead, they have greater or lesser significance 
or importance to the relevant audience, and gradually grow in ef-
fectiveness or fade from view. They acquire legal existence and 
weight when they become accepted as proper materials for legal 
argumentation. This occurs when the direction and accumulation 
of specific legal rules (statutory, judicial, or administrative) in a 
certain area of law suggests such a principle as the rationale for 
its existence and development, in the judgment of those who par-
ticipate in the legal process. 
Thus, not all policy statements can be characterized as legal 
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principles, as institutionally accepted grounds for judicial reason-
ing which may justify the overruling, limitation, or extension of 
specific rules which conflict with the rational implications of such 
a principle. Nor do they become legal by specific enactment, at 
one point of time, by an authorized body or procedure. They 
make their appearance over a period of time, as lawyers, judges, 
and scholars begin to appreciate the impact of a course of specific 
decisions or new rules. Their period of gestation is always charac-
terized by uncertainty as to whether they will attain successfully 
the status of a legitimate tool in the judicial armoury. 
Legal principles are particularly important in this view of the 
judicial process because they are explicitly concerned with values, 
with the purpose for which particular rules were enacted. Hence, 
they are means by which judges advert to the significance and 
desirability of the rules they propose to use, before applying them. 
Yet they maintain stability and responsibility within the system 
by furnishing a relatively objective and accepted standard for 
reasoning about the rules which are to be used. 
What about the use of principle in this particular problem 
area of the law? Two facts are significant. First, the criminal law 
is largely statutory now. By convention and law criminal offences 
must be created by the legislature. However, legislative activity 
is almost invariably fragmentary and usually directed only to the 
specific problem of the desirability of new criminal prohibitions, 
perhaps with some attention to procedure. These enactments are 
always dependent, to a greater or lesser extent, on a substratum 
of specific rules relating to individual responsibility and the crimi-
nal defences. These specific rules-age, insanity, self-defence, and 
so on-are sometimes contained in the Criminal Code; at other 
times they are found only in common law decisions or authorita-
tive texts. 
Second, this is one area where the conventional theory recog-
nizes a principle, the mens rea doctrine, as the authoritative basis 
for all of these specific rules. The many legal indicia of this con-
clusion are confirmed by the statutory provisions about the de-
fences in the Criminal Code.' Hence, this would appear to be a 
classic instance where the court should fulfill its role as a creative 
developer of the basic policies which support these defences, re-
fashioning the established rules to conform to changing facts and 
insights, and extending them in directions to which their internal 
logic points. The legislature seems consciously to have delegated 
4 S.C., 1953-54, cc. 51, 52 as am., s. 7(2): "Every rule and principleof 
the common law that renders any circumstance a justification or excuse for 
an act or a defence to a charee continues in force and apolies in resoect of 
proceedings for an offence under this Act or any other Act of the Parliament 
of Canada, except in so far as they are altered by or are i-consistent with 
this Act or any other Act of the Parliament of Canada." Italics mine. 
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this task to an institution which appears, on almost any standard, 
to be best qualified for it, if the court would accept it. 
Yet this is not to suggest that a court may legitimately inno-
vate just as it wishes in this area. Even if we are not overly con-
cerned with the absolute restraints of judicial precedent,' the court 
must respect the legislative will when the latter has spoken. To 
some extent, statutory language usually enacted on the basis of a 
nineteenth century perception of the mens rea problem, may have 
frozen the process of development and artificially precluded the 
judicial creation of a coherent and rational body of law in the 
area. Hence the Supreme Court is continually faced here with a 
delicate question in the theory of statutory interpretation-how 
clear a statement it would require from a legislature before ac-
quiescing in a departure from the basic legal principle which ani-
mates the whole area of law, both statutory and judge-made. 
I. Mens Rea and the Purposes 
of CriminalPunishment. 
The question then arises-what are the policies which are imple-
mented by the principle that mens rea is necessary for criminal 
liability? In order to understand what the court has done, as well 
as what it should do, we must be aware of the alternatives that 
are open. This requires knowledge of why mens rea should be an 
element in criminal guilt, in order that we formulate a standard 
for determining what the law ought to be, and thus might be, like. 
This in turn demands an enquiry into the nature of and reasons 
for criminal punishment.6 
The purpose of criminal punishment is the achievement of the 
object of the criminal law, which is the elimination or reduction of 
certain conduct considered to be harmful, or otherwise undesirable. 
The substantive criminal law indicates the patterns of conduct to 
be prohibited. In turn, these rules are dependent on some con-
ception of the society which we want to result from the patterns 
of conduct proscribed. Hence, this fact that crime control is not 
an absolute all-encompassing end in itself requires certain limita-
tions on the way the process is carried on, implied from the de-
mands of a free and just society which it is our object to create. 
It is important that the standards created by the substantive 
criminal law be enacted and stated in order that citizens be able 
to follow them, but this is not sufficient. The law needs to in-
fluence these decisions of private actors towards adherence to its 
I As to which see MacGuigan, Precedent and Policy in the Supreme 
Court (1967), 45 Can. Bar Rev. 627. 
6I do not claim any significant innovation in this sketch of the philoso-
phy of punishment and responsibility and have not documented in any 
detail my indebtedness to the recent work of such writers as Hart, Parker, 
Wechsler, Hall, Kadish, Wooten, and so on. 
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rules. Convictions, and what we do to convicted offenders, are 
the mechanisms for achieving this influence. Hence what we will 
call criminal punishment has as its purpose the various instruments 
which are designed to implement the substantive rules formulated 
by the law. 
Now, in cases involving the defence of mens rea, its use is 
logically dependent on and preceded by a finding that the defendant 
has engaged in the conduct which the criminal law prohibits. In 
other words, the harm which the law is intended to prevent has, 
in objective fact, occurred and can be connected in a causal way 
with the defendant's action or omission. The question then is, 
what are the reasons which justify the conclusion that the defen-
dant not be convicted and subjected to criminal punishment? 
These reasons can be grouped into two preliminary categories. The 
first is that, since the point of conviction is the sanction, the reasons 
which justify the latter would serve no such purpose in this case. 
Secondly, since these sanctions and the criminal law they imple-
ment are not absolute ends in themselves, they may have to yield 
to other countervailing policies and commitments to our society's 
ideals which weigh heavier in the scales. Despite the fact that ap-
plication of the sanctions would serve the purpose of the sanctions 
in making the criminal law effective, they would be harmful to the 
achievement of the kind of society which the criminal law is sup-
posed to protect. 
Hence the first arguments in favour of the defences are that 
they exclude from the punishment system those whose conviction 
and sentence would not serve its specific mechanisms. The latter 
are usually said to include retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, 
intimidation and rehabilitation. These may appropriately be divided 
into two categories, the one relating to the individual defendant, 
the other to citizens and the legal system generally. We may call 
these categories the behavioural and the legal, the one concerned 
with the criminal, the other with the crime.' 
' The focus of the first approach-the behavioural-is on the individual 
offender as a problem, as someone who may be dangerous in the future. 
Hence at a minimum he may be incarcerated (or perhaps executed) so as 
to negate any danger from him while he is thus incapacitated. If possible, 
though, the correctional authorities should try to change his dangerous 
character, either by intimidating him, making him feel the errors of his 
ways and fearful of future punishment, or by rehabilitatinghim, changing 
his internal psyche so that it no longer impels him towards criminal be-
haviour. 
The focus of the second approach-the legal-is on the criminal law 
as a system of rules, general standards which must be known and adhered 
to by those to whom they apply, in order that the policies which led to 
their adoption be achieved. Punishment deters by making the "economic" 
gains of crime marginally undesirable in terms of the risked losses. This 
narrow version of the theory may apply in some cases but it obviously 
does not in others. However, punishment, by representing the community's 
condemnation of certain conduct may reinforce and help define the inter-
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Assuming that these are the immediate goals of punishment, 
how is the doctrine of mens rea justified in their light? In a narrow 
utilitarian perspective, punishment is an evil-a pain-and thus 
presumptively undesirable. Hence there must be countervailing 
gains in order to overcome this presumption and thus support the 
use of the sanction. Where we can isolate cases to which these 
countervailing gains do not apply, we must make exceptions to 
the incidence of punishment. For example, the fear of punishment 
which acts as a deterrent and thus influences general adherence 
to the criminal law is such a gain, but there are cases in which 
such fear can have no meaning. 
This is especially true of criminal conduct which occurs by 
reason of accident or mistake because it does not make sense to 
threaten punishment in order to require adherence to rules one 
could not have complied with. The same is true of special justi-
fications such as self-defence or necessity where we prefer conduct 
which is prima facie criminal in such exceptional circumstances, 
because of the greater gains to society. Even if this conduct is not 
preferable, on balance, we may be able to understand in cases of 
provocation or duress the inevitable failure of deterrence suffi-
ciently that we not want to impose further needless pain on a 
technical offender. On the other hand, it is argued that, though 
punishment might not have any sense in individual cases, it does 
help maintain the credibility of the system of general deterrence. 
Every new exception that is created in an institutional setting of 
fallible fact-finding furnishes the possibility of leakage of actual, 
responsible offenders. Closing up the excuses for everybody, in-
cluding the bona fide cases, does increase the deterrent effect 
for would-be law breakers. 
The same analysis can be made about the behavioural per-
spective. This assumes the judgment that an individual is dan-
gerous and thus should be subjected to individualized official 
intervention and treatment. It is argued that only on proof of 
nalized standards of behaviour to which we adhere, more or less unthink-
ingly, and without any weighing of the marginal utility of legal and illegal 
alternatives. 
The legitimacy of retribution as an independent consideration in the 
justification of criminal punishment is hotly disputed at present. Though 
the goal of exacting social vengeance from the criminal for the harm he 
has caused is no longer viewed with much favour, there is substantial 
recent interest in some subtler values which are connoted by this theory. 
It has been suggested that criminal punishment is necessary to implement 
the ideals of fairness and equality within a legal system by restoring the 
equilibrium in benefits and burdens which has been disturbed by the crimi-
nal offences. Retributive justice requires that we punish only those who are 
in breach of substantive standards of the criminal law, but that we punish 
all of those who do disobey, and that such punishment be meted out in 
some appropriate proportion to the relative seriousness of the offence. This 
final basis of the criminal sanction is particularly relevant to the mens rea 
issue. 
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responsible decisions to break the law can we rely for the judgment 
that one individual is distinctively more dangerous than another. 
The mere objective fact of causing the harm prohibited by the 
criminal law does not tell us anything reliable about a defendant 
who was thrust into an environment where he acted out of ig-
norance to cause an accidental harm. Yet it is obvious that this 
is not so in the case of certain irresponsible offenders such as the 
insane, the epileptic, perhaps the accident-prone. In fact, the 
logical thrust of the behavioural school is towards the develop-
ment of prediction tables which would subject the delinquency-
prone to compulsory treatment and attitude change. This leads 
inevitably to the position that we should dispose not only of the 
requirement that an individual engaged in criminal conduct respon-
sibly, but also of the logically prior requirement that he engaged 
in any specific criminal conduct at all. 
Although, it is true, as I have argued, that this utilitarian 
rationale for mens rea may not apply absolutely, -and to all cases, 
it does establish a substantial prima facie case for the defence. It 
requires demonstrated, not simply hypothetical, arguments to re-
but it in the ways I have suggested are possible. Even if these 
countervailing reasons are advanced on this level, further argu-
ments may fill the breach. These stem from a subtler view of the 
general influence of criminal standards. It is unlikely that the real 
impact is based on the rational fear of pain. Deterrence is much 
more ephemeral than the theory of the rational weighing of the 
pleasures or gains from criminal conduct against the pains or costs 
of the sanctions which are risked. Instead, the leverage of the 
criminal law as regards the vast majority of the populace inheres 
in their voluntary acceptance of its dictates as morally proper, 
such that they do not think of the criminal alternative, or they 
recoil emotionally from it even where they would not likely be 
detected. 
This analysis is probably true of the ordinary operation of the 
system, although there are exceptions in the case of certain "con-
ventional" crimes or certain marginal and alienated groups. If to 
break the criminal law is to do something morally wrong, then 
the essence of criminal punishment is the expression of the com-
munity's moral condemnation-its hatred, fear, and contempt of 
the conduct engaged in by the offender-and not simply to impose 
those unpleasant physical consequences or treatment as a result. 
This conventional or symbolic device serves to dramatize and re-
inforce the community's moral condemnation and disavowal of 
the offence and its stigmatization of the offender. To single out, 
in a systematic way, blameless or irresponsible individuals as the 
objects of this "morality play" is not only parasitic and unfair, 
but may well be self-defeating. It results in a loss of the aura of 
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moral acceptability and worthiness which it is the point of criminal 
punishment to reinforce. It is important that society not lose sight 
of the distinction between harmful response by society which car-
ries this condemnatory aura and a perhaps equally harmful societal 
response which is purely amoral in character. 
Of course this whole argument is unacceptable to those who 
would advocate the elimination of punishment, in the sense of 
pain or hardship expressing moral blame. The behavioural view 
is willing to risk the loss of any general influence of punishment 
on other members of society who might choose to adhere volun-
tarily to criminal standards as a result. The individual offender, 
whoever he is, is a sick, albeit dangerous individual, to be treated 
if he is discovered, but not amenable to the individual influence 
of example. Although pain or hardship may be a characteristic of 
treatment, it is such only as an unavoidable concomitant of scienti-
fic, therapeutic measures for rehabilitation of individual cases. 
Even to this argument, in the areas where it may be justified, 
there is a third rationale for the doctrine of mens rea, the argu-
ment from legality and individual freedom. 
What is distinctive about this last rationale is that it is not 
utilitarian in the direct or subtler senses of the first two. It is not 
concerned with the attainment of goals in the most effective and 
least costly fashion. Rather it is designed to protect certain values 
by imposing limitations on the means adopted by society in its 
pursuit of goals through a system of criminal punishment. As such 
it is comprised within the family of notions associated with justice 
and fairness. 
There are two different foci to this argument. In a negative 
sense, the requirement of mens rea follows ineluctably from the 
requirement of conduct. Legal rules must point to action, to a 
person doing something, rather than to his status, character, and 
so on, if they purport to be a real restraint on official discretion. 
It is true that certain kinds of status may be sufficiently well-
defined by their symptoms or indicia that they can be the basis 
of the objective application of communicable legal rules (for 
instance, perhaps, psychotics or drug addicts). This cannot be 
true, certainly in our present state of knowledge, of a vague 
generalized standard such as "dangerous" or "requiring treatment". 
The latter type of standard would confer far too much discretion 
on officials and so we want to limit their power of intervention to 
cases where a person has done something. 
Yet how can we define conduct except by incorporating some 
reference to intent or other such mental element? Take the im-
portant crimes of murder or theft, each of which prohibits con-
duct causing a certain consequence (death or deprivation of 
property respectively). I suggest that we cannot meaningfully 
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isolate those involved in producing the result except by reference 
to some standard of subjective responsibility for it. If this is not 
explicit, then inevitably the concept of "cause" will change from 
the bare but meaningful standard of "but for" to a more ambig-
uous criterion incorporating a tacit reference to "expectations". 
The same is true of many crimes which prohibit doing things with 
a specific intent (attempt, burglary, and so on), or without it (as-
sault, rape, and so on). In order to implement a significant con-
duct limitation on the criminal process then, we must also have a 
doctrinal requirement of mens rea. If we do not have the conduct 
limitation we lose the restraints of legality on our official exercise 
of this most serious power. 
The second focus of this rationale is more positive. The law 
makes the assumption that we are responsible choosing beings. 
Even if this cannot be demonstrated metaphysically, it is hard 
to see how, given our present psychological make-up, we can 
avoid acting on the assumption that this is true. Certainly this as-
sumption must be made about the bases for the action of our 
officials, if not of the "objects" they purport to control. If we 
assume further that there are no significant differences in this 
respect, metaphysically or psychologically, between officialdom 
and those subject to the criminal law, then respect for our free-
dom of choice requires a social structure, including a criminal 
law, which supports and protects it. 
The whole point of a criminal law which consists of rules, 
and general norms, is that it both enables and demands that in-
dividuals "self-apply" them to their proposed conduct and decide 
whether to obey or not. If we have no doctrinal requirement of 
mens rea, then punishment will become arbitrary-inflicted be-
cause of unintended fortuitous consequences. Obedience will be 
deprived of meaning and significance because apparently sufficient 
attempts to comply will no longer determine whether or not a 
person suffers the sanctions attached to non-compliance. The 
result will be that the sanctions will lose much of their influence 
and impact, or that citizens will be driven from areas of desirable 
but borderline conduct. 
Even if these are not the effects, we impose real costs on in-
dividuals by depriving them of the chance to order their lives as 
much as possible on the basis of their own choice of conduct or 
consequence. We deprive them of the power to choose to stay 
out of the clutches of the criminal law. Even if we follow the 
behaviouralists in their quest to remove all intended connotations 
of pain or blame, penalty and punishment, from the criminal law, 
we still impose a real cost on individuals who are put through it, 
a real risk that the wrong "therapeutic" choice will be made. We 
deprive them of the sense of security, then, which is associated 
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with a social structure permitting us to choose and plan what our 
futures will be. All of this is to no purpose, either, because treat-
ment must obviously consider the mental state of the offender at 
the post-conviction sentence and correctional stage. Only some of 
the innocent people will be accident-prone while most will prove 
to be ordinary, though unlucky. Yet we leave these judgments to 
the discretion of our officials, rather than as a requirement of 
viable objective standards. We make them near the end of the 
process, rather than at the beginning, where the ordinary unlucky 
person will get the benefit of exclusion from the "therapeutic ex-
perience". 
Finally, the absence of a doctrine of responsibility in the 
criminal process denies in this very important instrument the very 
assumption of the society which, inter alia, the behavioural cor-
rectional authorities are trying to achieve with it. This assumption 
is that the members of the society are persons, individuals having 
human rights and concomitant obligations, whose inalienably equal 
character can only be accounted for by their power of free choice. 
Such principles as justice and equality stem from a recognition of 
the demand that all individuals should be free to work out their 
own destinies within restraints which are designed to protect the 
same freedom of action of their fellows. It is incompatible with 
this ideal that such a basic institution as the criminal law assume 
that there is no point in enquiring whether or not these restraints 
have been freely broken, before the decision to intervene crudely 
and forcibly in his freedom of action is warranted. 
These are the complex of ideas and attitudes which coalesce 
in the principle that mens rea should be the basis of criminal 
liability. Each reason can be attacked as vulnerable in certain 
areas and, like all value arguments, none is certain and self-evident. 
However, cumulatively, they make a strong presumptive case 
which can and should be over-ridden only for good and adequate 
reasons which are responsive to each of these arguments. 
Moreover these arguments apply in several different fashions. 
As we shall see, sometimes the court is required to decide whether 
"fault" shall be a condition for criminal guilt or not. On other 
occasions the question is simply the degree of fault that is neces-
sary or, even more peripherally, how extensively certain doctrines 
or statutory provisions affecting the scope of mens rea should be 
interpreted. The point is that each of these strands of argument 
relating to responsibility are relevant in any one of these situations 
and that all of these problems are inextricably connected. A court 
which is trying to comply with the demands of the principle of 
mens rea must be sensitive to its demands in all the contexts in 
which it arises, must see the relevant analogies between these dif-
ferent situations and must ensure that its decisions fit together in 
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some coherent fashion. 
II. Behavioural Analysis of Supreme Court 
Decision-making. 
The orientation of this study is, or so I hope, an integrated view 
of the operations of the judicial process. The kinds of cases that 
come to the highest appellate court in the land involve sufficient 
importance, and sufficient ambiguity, that strongly-held attitudes 
are likely to be reflected in the pattern of decision-making. Behav-
ioural analysis of the flow of decisions is likely to isolate any 
such attitudes and indicate their influence on the judicial choices 
made. It will also help determine the inter-personal influences 
within the court, the interest and impact each person has in the 
decision-making process, at least so far as can be gained from 
perusal of blocs, majorities and minorities, opinion-writing, con-
currences, and so on. 
However, I assume that courts are more than judicial voters, 
and that the significant aspects of judicial behaviour are not con-
fined to their votes. Between the vote and the general reasons 
they give for the vote are the legal rules - the generalizations 
and doctrines they decide to adopt and apply to the specific case. 
Many different kinds of issues may coalesce in a particular case 
and may result in a final voting decision one way or the other. 
In assessing their behaviour, it is important to isolate the pattern 
of decisions about a particular, defined family of rules or doctrines 
and assess judicial attitudes to the doctrine. Such an assumption is 
valid if for no other reason than that the real impact of the court 
comes from the legal rules they establish. Only a small number 
of cases reach the court for specific decision and the real impact 
of the policies they establish comes from the application by others 
of the general rules they formulate. 
However, the creation of rules by courts is not simply the 
exercise of a fiat, the enactment of specific authoritative language. 
Judicial development of rules is the product of reasoned opinions 
and this process of reasoning must be assumed to have some in-
fluence on the rules which result. Hence an integrated approach 
requires a systematic sustained study of the kinds of reasons which 
the court utilizes in this one segment of its work, this one doc-
trinal area. Our objective will be the characterization of the style 
of reasoning employed by the court, whether "formal" and positi-
vist or "grand" and purposive. As we shall see, the court's style 
is overwhelmingly formal and legalistic. Although the whole trend 
of its opinions is thus to disguise the fact of its choice among 
alternatives left within the interstices of abstract doctrine, merely 
to decide is to make a choice, as far as the court is concerned. As 
we shall also see, the evidence is overwhelming that these choices 
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are not made randomly between different policy outcomes, by the 
different judges. Yet their confinement to the formalistic approach 
seriously limits the clarity and impact of the policy they seek to 
implement. 
Hence I feel it is extremely useful to subject the Supreme 
Court decisions in this area to systematic, quantitative investigation. 
If patterns of behaviour do emerge, their analysis can be very 
helpful in understanding and assessing the court's decision-making 
process. The fact that such investigations may not be a sufficient 
source of explanation is no reason for refusing to recognize their 
necessary place in any fully-integrated theory of the court's opera-
tions. The versions which follow are very simple and very tentative 
but, I believe, quite suggestive of fruitful inferences. From some 
of my factual findings I draw no such inferences, and merely 
report the results as part of an ongoing study in which they will 
play a further role. 
The first behavioural investigation to be reported concerns the 
use of the cumulative scale to detect attitudinal bases for judicial 
decisions. The theoretical and technical facets of the Guttman 
scale are quite complicated and have been adequately analyzed 
elsewhere.' In the final analysis, though, their significance is quite 
simple. We start with a group of judges who are exposed to a 
series of cases with very different factual, procedural, and legal 
problems. When we see what the judges do with these situations, 
we find not a random distribution of decisions, but a coherent 
reproducible pattern, when they are considered from a particular 
dimension. If statistical criteria excluding chance are met, it be-
comes legitimate (though perhaps not scientifically necessary) 
to infer that the judges perceived these cases along this particular 
dimension and voted in accordance with their attitude to it.9 This 
may be true at least of those judges at either end of the spectrum 
who consistently vote in favour of one position, notwithstanding 
I See Peck, A Behavioural Approach to the Judicial Process: Scalogram 
Analysis (1967), 5 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1; The Supreme Court of Canada 
1958-1966: A Search for Policy Through Scalogram Analysis (1967), 45 
Can. Bar Rev. 666, esp., at pp. 713-722. 
* The reason why scalogram analysis does not demonstrate the existence 
and influence of judicial attitudes with scientific certainty is that it depends 
to a substantial extent on a circular argument. In effect, the use of a scale 
assumes that it is possible to infer judicial attitudes from the pattern of 
their votes and that these attitudes can then be used to explain this very 
voting pattern. The difficulty is that the judges may not have perceived 
their votes as expressing, the values which the behaviouralist imputes to 
their decision. What is lacking in most scaling up to now has been an in-
dependent test of the existence of judicial values, through interviews, ques-
tionnaires, content analysis of their opinions or non-judicial utterances, or 
examination of their backgrounds. Once there is such independent evidence 
of a judicial preference for the criminal defendant, for instance, it becomes 
a much more plausible explanation of a consistent pattern of votes for the 
defendant. 
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the great variety of conventional legal contexts in which it is 
raised. 
Because my object in this article is a little different from most 
behavioural investigations of the judicial process, I have not limited 
myself to the conventional parameters of the Guttman scale. I 
have created two scales of the twenty-three decisions relating to 
mens rea in this area. One of the scales deals with votes for the 
defendant or the Crown in the case; the second deals with opinions 
in favour of, or against the value of mens rea. As will be seen, 
although the cases all clearly raise this issue, not all judges ieach 
a decision about it in the course of explaining their vote. I assume 
that within a system of stare decisis, where rules become estab-
lished by their statement in judicial opinions, the decision to ex-
press a favourable or unfavourable view of mens rea in a par-
ticular context (or the failure to speak to this issue at all) is at 
least as significant for criminal defendants in our legal system as 
the decision to vote for or against the defendant in the particular 
case. I also assume that judges in our appellate court perceive the 
authoritative significance of their decision about what they do or 
do not say about the legal rule at issue and that these decisions are 
equally indicative of their personal attitudes as are their votes. 
In constructing the scales I have included all unanimous deci-
sions, as well as the divided ones, although I have isolated the 
latter on the scale. Though perhaps in conflict with scaling theory, 
including unanimous decisions is helpful in understanding the 
court's work as a whole, especially when we see differences in the 
way certain cases line up on the criminal defendant and the mens 
rea dimensions. Moreover, the theoretical assumptions which re-
quire exclusion of unanimous cases become somewhat strained 
when applied to a court which sits in panels. 
What are the conclusions which can be drawn from these 
scales? If we compare the two, we can see several radical dif-
ferences in the cases themselves. O'Grady," which was 7-2 for the 
Crown vote scale, becomes 9-0 in favour of the mens rea position. 
Binus," which was 5-0 for the Crown in votes, becomes 3-2 for 
the mens rea position. King," which was 5-0 for the defendant 
on the voting scale, becomes only 3-0 on the mens rea scale. 
George," which was 4-1 for the Crown on the voting scale is 4-0 
on the mens rea scale. Lemire," which was 4-3 for the Crown on 
the voting scale, becomes 4-0 on the mens rea scale. This number 
of instances together should raise questions about the desirability 
of excluding apparently unanimous decisions from behavioural 
analysis." 
'0 O'Grady v. Sparling, [1960] S.C.R. 804. 
n1 R. v. Binus, [19671 S C.R. 594. "R. v. King. [19621 S.C.R. 746. 
"R. v. George. [19601 SC R R71. "R. v. Lpmire. T19651 S C.R. 174. 
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The attitudinal break-down of the judges remains unchanged, 
though. What are our findings? At one extreme end of the scale 
is Cartwright J. He voted for the defendant in every case, unani-
mous and divided, except Binus. As was stated above regarding 
this case, on the issue on which there was a divided opinion in 
the court he voted for the defendant( or mens rea). Of the present 
judges on the court, Hall and Spence JJ. appear close to Cart-
wright J. in attitude. Hall J. agreed with Cartwright J. in every 
case in which they participated, and voted for the defendant on 
both scales in every case except Wright," a unanimous decision 
in which Cartwright J. did not participate. Spence J. voted with 
Cartwright J. in every case in which they participated, Binus being 
the only case in which he voted for the Crown on either scale. On 
the court in the Fifties, Estey and Rand JJ. tended to agree with 
Cartwright J., more often than not, but were not so consistent in 
favour of the defendant. Locke J., a most interesting case, I will 
leave for later. 
At the other end of the scale, Fauteux J. voted for the Crown 
on both scales in every divided decision. Unlike Cartwright J., 
though, he was ready to vote for the defendant in cases the court 
perceived unanimously. Taschereau J. agreed with Fauteaux J. in 
every case but two, and voted for the defendant in divided cases 
only in these two. One of these, Laroche, " is explainable for 
reasons suggested earlier. The other, Rees," a 6-1 decision for the 
defendant, perhaps aptly distinguishes Fauteaux J.'s slightly more 
extreme attitude from Taschereau J.'s. Judson J. also voted for the 
defendant only once in divided cases, More" (a 5-2 decision), 
and agreed with Taschereau J. and Fauteux J. in every other case 
in which either of these latter participated. 
Each of these findings about the extremes is substantiated not 
only on the two mens rea scales but also on the general criminal 
law scales constructed by Professor Peck.20The fact that the latter's 
scales have quite a different selection of cases, based on a wider 
area of criminal law for a shorter time period, makes this inde-
require major adjustments, though some apparent anomalies are explained. 
Cartwright J. voted for the Crown only in Binus, but, on investigation, the 
major thrust of his opinion was the adoption of a very pro-defendant mens 
rea rule, one which still convicted this defendant on the facts. Spence and 
Ritchie JJ. also changed in the same way. Taschereau J.'s anomalous vote 
for the accused in Lemire turns out to be based on a jurisdictional ground. 
Judson J.'s vote for the defendant in King is apparently a result of the 
Crown's failure to appeal on grounds which would have succeeded as far 
as he was concerned. Locke J.'s seemingly unscalable pattern is somewhat 
diluted, and perhaps explained, by his decision in King and George to 
decide on neutral grounds. 
" R. v. Wright, [19691 S.C.R. 335. 
"'R. v. Laroche, [19641 S.C.R. 667. 
" The Queen v. Rees, [19561 S.C.R. 640. 
"More v. The Queen (1963), 3 C.C.C. 289 (S.C.C.). 
2" Op. cit., footnote 8. 
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pendent verification quite significant. The position as regards the 
middle judges is somewhat different, though, which is perhaps 
indicative of their less ideological viewpoint and less attitudinally-
based voting. 
Abbott J. is much more in the centre of this scale than in Pro-
fessor Peck's criminal law scale. He voted for the Crown in 3-2 
and 5-4 decisions for the Crown, and for the defendant in a 4-3 
decision in favour of the defendant. On the mens rea vote scale 
he voted for the Crown five times out of eight in divided decisions 
and four times out of seven on the mens rea issue scale. Ritchie 
and Martland JJ. are to the right of Abbott J. on these scales 
while they were to the left on Professor Peck's scales. Of greater 
interest as regards the latter two is their perfect concurrence with 
each other, in unanimous decisions and divided ones, for the 
Crown or for the defendant, and on both scales, even where they 
do not decide on the mens rea issue. The relative position of the 
two is also indicated by their perfect concurrence with Judson J. 
on the mens rea vote scale. 
Locke J., as we have said, is very interesting and unique. On 
Professor Peck's general criminal law scale, he was to the right of 
everyone except Fauteux, Taschereau and Judson JJ. On each 
of my scales he is to the left of everyone except Cartwright J. Yet 
his position there accounts for three of the six inconsistencies on 
the vote scale and three of the five on the issue scale, all because 
of votes for the Crown. He voted five times for the defendant 
and five times for the Crown in divided decisions on the vote 
scale. Most of the affirmative votes for the defendant which ac-
count for his very low break-point are very tenuous on closer 
analysis (see O'Grady, King and George). In King and George 
he did not decide about the mens rea issue at all, and he was 
the only judge of whom this was true more than once. Yet his vote 
for the defendant in Shymkowich" was the only dissenting vote 
for the defendant, and only Cartwright J. showed this distinction 
of voting alone for the defendant on the whole scale. In conven-
tional terms, then, he must remain where he is on the scale. It is 
probably correct to say, on the available evidence, that he does 
not appear overly influenced by the criminal defendant or mens 
rea attitude. Further evidence must be sought in other scales, 
dealing for example with criminal procedure or the substantive 
offences. 
A third table furnishes a somewhat different type of informa-
tion. The first patterns which emerge from this table concern 
trends of unanimous and divided decisions on the court. If we 
divide the court into two periods, one from 1951-1960, the 
other from 1961-1969, there are twelve cases in the first period 
"1R. v. Shymkowich, [1954] S.C.R. 606. 
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and eleven in the second. In the first period there is only one 
unanimous decision, the other eleven being divided. The unanimous 
decision was for the defendant, as were three of the divided cases. 
The other eight decisions, all divided, were for the Crown. From 
1961-1969, there were eight unanimous decisions, five for the 
defendant and three for the Crown. The three divided decisions 
included one for the defendant and two for the Crown, giving a 
total of six for the defendant and five for the Crown. 
Hence, in the Fifties, there were far more divided decisions 
and decisions for the Crown. In the Sixties, there was a sufficient 
change in trend that a large majority of the decisions were unani-
mous and a small majority in favour of the defendant. Though 
not apparent from this table, each such tendency is less pronounced 
if we look at decisions on the issue scale. In the first period, there 
were three unanimous and nine divided, a total of five for the 
defendant and seven for the Crown. In the second period, there 
were seven unanimous and four divided, six for the defendant 
and five for the Crown. 
The table furnishes a second kind of interesting information, 
this time about individual patterns and blocs in opinion-writing. 
Cartwright J. participated in eighteen out of twenty-three possible 
cases and wrote fifteen opinions. He wrote eight of these for the 
majority of which three were concurred in and seven dissenting 
opinions of which three were concurred in (only Fauteux and 
Estey JJ. also wrote dissenting opinions which were concurred in). 
In the other three cases, Cartwright J. concurred in opinions with 
Estey J. (dissenting), Rand and Ritchie JJ. In general, Cart-
wright J. appears to be somewhat alone in opinion-writing, with 
no identifiable bloc which identifies with him, or in which he 
joins, notwithstanding voting agreement with Estey and Rand JJ. 
in the Fifties and Hall and Spence JJ. in the Sixties. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Fauteux J. participated in 
twenty-one of twenty-three possible cases, and wrote ten opinions. 
He wrote six majority opinions, of which five were concurred in, 
and four dissents, of which three were concurred in. In the other 
eleven cases, he concurred in eleven majority opinions, not one 
of which was written by Taschereau J. In fact, Taschereau J., who 
participated in nineteen out of twenty-three cases, and wrote five 
opinions, three majority and two dissenting, never once attracted 
a concurring vote of anyone to his opinions. He himself concurred 
in one dissenting opinion, written by Fauteux J. and eight more 
were also concurred in by Fauteux J. Hence, the high degree of 
voting concurrence of Fauteux and Taschereau JJ. is also reflected 
in opinion concurrence, but the latter demonstrates the dominant 
character of Fauteux J. in this partnership. 
Between these two extremes is the pivotal group led by Rit-
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chie J. The latter sat in all thirteen cases before the court during 
his tenure and never once was in the minority. He wrote six 
majority opinions and all six were concurred in by a majority of 
the court. Fauteux J. concurred in Ritchie J.'s opinions three 
times, more than he did with anyone else. Martland J. sat in 
eleven out of fourteen cases, also never dissented, but wrote only 
one opinion, which was concurred in by a majority including 
Ritchie and Fauteux JJ. He concurred in six opinions of Ritchie J. 
and in three other cases he concurred in opinions which also were 
concurred in by Ritchie and Judson JJ., sat in ten out of fourteen 
possible cases and wrote four opinions. One of the latter (Binus) 
was in effect a minority decision about the legal problem. Although 
he concurred in three Ritchie J.'s opinions, and Ritchie J. con-
curred in two of his, he is not a solid member of Ritchie J.'s 
bloc. In two important cases, King and Binus, he did not agree 
with the Ritchie opinions about basic legal questions." 
Much of this information is not of great significance for the 
small sample from which it is drawn. The important inferences 
which can be drawn for immediate purposes will be drawn later. 
The information relating to unanimity, opinion-writing, blocs, 
and so on, is reported here, though, as the first of a series of in-
vestigations of the court's work. The information may assume 
much greater significance later if the same patterns are reproduced 
in other areas of the court's work. 
The third table is concerned with another distinctive kind of 
information. In an effort to assess the complexity and sophistica-
tion of the court's opinions, I used as the index the number of 
legal authorities cited in each opinion. I counted only the authori-
ties cited relating to the mens rea issue. The following are the 
findings: 
Again, much of this information is useful only if it is put in 
the context of a larger picture of the Supreme Court's work. How-
ever, from this limited sample, several conclusions are quite in-
teresting, perhaps the most significant of which are the relatively 
few citations per case and the substantial decrease in recent years. 
It is almost incredible to find that each case averages only about 
six (6.3) citations, and each opinion only two (2.2). Because 
" The other judges are all somewhat unique. Abbott J. sat in ten of 
twenty cases and never once wrote an Qpinion. He dissented only once, 
following Fauteux J., and joined in a great variety of majority opinions 
from different judges. Rand J. appeared in eight of nine possible cases and 
wrote seven times, six in the majority. In the Fifties, there was a much 
greater tendency towards short separate opinions by all judges, and much 
less evidence of blocs from such as Estey, Kerwin, or Kellock JJ. Locke J., 
who participated in twelve of thirteen possible cases, was as flexible here as 
elsewhere. He wrote three majority opinions for the Crown and two for the 
defendant. He wrote two dissenting opinions for the defendant. He con-
curred five times, twice in dissent, three times in the majority, twice for 
the Crown and three times for the defendant. He concurred with Cart-
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the majority opinions average less than two citations, while the 
dissenting opinions have about three, we can help explain the 
substantial decrease in the Sixties. There were far more unanimous 
opinions in the Sixties, each case averaged less than two-thirds 
the number of opinions, and there was much less citation of legal 
authority. In the Fifties, each case averaged about ten (9.83) 
citations, and three (3.05) per opinion, while in the Sixties, each 
case averaged three (3.3) citations, and one (1.3) per opinion. 
The big difference lies in the dissenting opinions, which average 
three citations per opinion in the Fifties, but less than one (0.4) 
in the Sixties. 
These qualitative findings are matched by the impression 
gained from reading the opinions themselves. That they are not a 
function of the simplicity of the cases and the issues they represent 
can easily be seen if one compares the opinions in the Courts of 
Appeal in the same cases or in the House of Lords on the same 
issue. The Supreme Court opinions are very short and sparsely-
reasoned and almost all lengthier opinions consist in discussion 
of the facts and the judge's jury trial. Although not one periodical 
article was ever cited, texts are not infrequently used as authority 
(thirty-two times, by comparison with 113 citations). The court's 
techniques in using and assessing authorities are considered later 
on. 
When we look at the individual judges, the same impression 
emerges. The relative use of precedent remains a good indicator 
of the complexity of reasoning and argument. Fauteaux J. has the 
highest average, the only close competitor being Ritchie J. though 
no-one approaches Fauteux J. in the quality of his opinions. Cart-
wright and Taschereau JJ. are somewhere in the centre. Rand J. 
rarely cited an opinion and this aptly indicated the contribution 
he made to the quality of our law. The same judgment can be 
made about Judson J. Later papers will deal with the general 
validity of these conclusions. 
Several tentative conclusions appear to emerge from this 
analysis. Clear pro-defendant or pro-Crown attitudes appear to be 
reflected in the mens rea decisions of Cartwright and Fauteux JJ. 
respectively. Although several judges throughout the period voted 
regularly in support of Cartwright J. he did not have the total 
acquiescence, especially in opinion-concurrence, that Taschereau 
J. gave Fauteux J. In recent years the dominant figure appeared 
to be Ritchie J., who obtained the same kind of support from Mart-
land J., usually headed the swing bloc which decided disputed 
cases. In recent years this bloc and the Fauteux-Taschereau JJ. 
duo, together with Judson J. who tends to oscillate between them, 
appear to have taken control in this area. 
Such non-random patterns of behaviour, when perceived along 
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the attitudinal dimension, suggests the hypothesis that the prior law 
in this area left substantial room for judicial discretion and policy-
making. The figures relating to citation of authority reinforce this 
conclusion by indicating the relative lack of concern of the court 
with the sources in which established law might be found. At the 
moment these remain hypotheses, though, and await some con-
firmation in detailed analyses of the court's approach to specific 
areas of law. These are the subject of the next major section of 
this article. 
III. The Individual Legal Doctrines. 
A. Mens Rea and Strict Liability. 
Within this period of study, in three unrelated but very im-
portant decisions, the Supreme Court authoritatively established, 
in verbal form at least, the principle of mens rea. By this I mean 
that the court indicated that a requirement of mens rea was to be 
presumed in interpreting all statutory crimes. However, it was 
not to be considered an absolute requirement, because not only 
could the legislature explicitly exclude it, but such an exclusion 
could be inferred from the object or subject-matter of the legisla-
tion. Hence, the presumption is somewhat attenuated because the 
court not only permits the legislature constitutionally to make in-
nocent conduct criminal but it is also prepared to make this 
decision itself (though disguising it as "interpretation" of what 
is implied). 
The first decision was The Queen v. Rees" where the defendant 
had intercourse with a sixteen-year-old girl whom he was told 
and honestly and reasonably believed to be eighteen. He was 
charged with "knowingly or wilfully contributing to juvenile de-
linquency" under section 33(1) (b) of the British Columbia 
Juvenile Delinquents Act. His defence was his lack of knowledge 
of the fact the girl was a juvenile and thus an absence of mens rea. 
The Supreme Court, in a 6-1 decision, reversed the British Colum-
bia Court of Appeal and held this to be a good defence. 
The case is important because it was the first where the 
Supreme Court was forced to articulate its role in the development 
of the notion of criminal blameworthiness. In nineteenth century 
English law, there were two strands of development concerning 
mens rea, neither of which had authoritatively entered Canadian 
law, at least so as to bind the Supreme Court. In certain traditional 
crimes, the requirement of mens rea had been somewhat eroded 
at least as regards knowledge of some of the elements making 
conduct criminal." Another category of vaguely defined statutory, 
" Supra, footnote 18. 
" See R. v. Prince (1875), L.R. 2 C.C.R. 154; R. v. Tolson (1889), 
23 Q.B.D. 168 and R. v. Wheat, [1921] 2 K.B. 119. 
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public welfare offences was interpreted as, sometimes, impliedly 
dispensing with the notion of fault." This case, Rees, involved the 
problem of mens rea and the traditional mala in se, crime. 
Even more interesting is that the facts here are so closely 
analogous to the most celebrated of all mens rea cases, R. v. 
Prince." The defendant there was charged with "unlawfully" re-
moving a girl under sixteen from the custody of her father with-
out his consent and claimed that he had an honest and reasonable 
belief she was in fact 18. A variety of reasons were given by the 
majority for the judgment that the defendant's beliefs about this 
particular element were irrelevant and he ran the risk that he was 
right about the age. 
With this classic background, the stage was set for a clear 
mandate from the Supreme Court concerning its attitude towards 
mens rea. Its performance, though, was somewhat disappointing. 
In this case, as in the field generally, the real debate is between 
Cartwright and Fauteux JJ.27 Cartwright J.28adopts a rather broad 
perspective on the problem, though in a very sketchy way. First 
of all, he refers to section 7(2) of the Code which purports to 
preserve all common law defences, as a prelude to his discussion 
of the basic maxim of the defence of mistake of fact. His citation 
of certain references which support the principle includes Stephen's 
classic statement in Tolson," and he is careful to counter with 
another statement from Lord Goddard that the honesty and good 
faith of the mistake is alone critical, and that its reasonableness is 
purely evidentiary. He adopts certain language in Watts andGaunt" 
which creates a presumption of mens rea, and adds the presump-
tion that this must apply to all the elements of the offence. There 
follows the same technical distinction of Prince and the reference 
to section 138(c). However, he concludes with consideration of 
the sense of the problem, pointing out that the critical fact here in 
" Beginning, it seems, with R. v. Woodrow (1846), 153 E.R. 907. See 
Sayre, Public Welfare Offences (1933), 33 Col. L. Rev. 55. 
26 Supra, footnote 24. 
27 In the first three separate opinions, Kerwin, Taschereau, and Rand JJ. 
define the issue as a very narrow, legalistic question of statutory interpre-
tation. The legislature has used the word "knowingly" and references in 
Williams, Criminal Law (1st ed., 1953), indicate that this establishes a 
requirement of intent as regards all the elements of the offence. The Prince 
case is distinguishable because the word used there was "unlawfully" rather 
than "knowingly". To the policy argument that it is preferable to throw the 
risk of ignorance on the defendant, the judges' response is simply that their 
job is to discover the legislature's intent, rather than to develop its policy. 
Intention can be gathered only from language, no distinction between the 
elements of act and of age is indicated, and this lack of intent is corrobo-
rated by the statutory rape clause, s. 133(1), where Parliament did ex-
plicitly dispense with knowledge of the girl's age. 
" In an opinion concurred in by Nolan J. 
29 Supra, footnote 24.
30 [1953] 1 S.C.R. 505. This case is discussed in detail later on. 
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altering the innocence or permissibility of the defendant's conduct 
is the age of the girl. He would find it strange that Parliament 
should want the knowledge of this key fact, and it alone, to be 
legally irrelevant. Hence what characterizes Cartwright J.'s judg-
ment is not that he ignores the technical legal problems in assessing 
the relevant authoritative material-rather, he also sees the wider 
significance of the problem, that a substratum of general common 
law principle underlies the specific issues of interpretation, and that 
this background structures certain attitudes or presumptions with 
which the court must approach each narrow problem. 
Fauteux J.'s dissenting opinion is also a more reflective one 
than the first three, but curiously indifferent to the "legal" aspects 
of the problem. He says that an earlier maxim requiring a guilty 
mind for every criminal offence no longer obtains, even as a pre-
sumption. Instead one must look to the object and scope of each 
statutory provision, in the light of purposive and remedial views 
of the task of interpretation, to see how far knowledge is of the 
essence. The object here is to protect children against juvenile 
delinquency, but an honest and reasonable belief that this will not 
be the effects of one's conduct would be no defence. Because it 
need not apply to all elements, it should not apply to the question 
of the child's age. In order to serve the object of protecting the 
child, the accused must take the risk of the trier of fact agreeing 
with him about how old she actually or apparently is. Fauteux J. 
does not debate with Cartwright J. the established legal signifi-
cance of the principle of mens rea, nor does he meet the arguments 
relating to the word "knowingly" and the structure of section 
138(1). He simply assumes that child protection legislation is 
an over-riding goal which must be pursued to the exclusion of the 
claims of mens rea. 
There are two gaps in this case. First, most of the judges 
treated it as simply a problem of assessing the significance of the 
word "knowingly", and this kind of literal analysis would not 
stand them in good stead when the vagaries of statutory draftsman-
ship faced them with the problem of deciding without any help 
from the legislature at all. Secondly, even those judges who did 
see the specific issue as an instance of a general, recurring prob-
lem did not address themselves at all to the policies which war-
rant the requirement of mens rea and the countervailing reasons for 
excluding it in certain cases. Even if Cartwright and Fauteux JJ. 
realized that the court was obliged to play an independent decision-
making role in this area, one which required that they advert to 
arguments about why they should move in one direction or another, 
they give us only faint hints of that fact. This pattern carried 
over into the next such case in the sequence. 
In Beaver v. The Queen," the defendant was convicted of 
" [1957] S.C.R. 531. 
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illegal possession of a narcotic drug. His defence was that he had 
been led to believe by a confederate that he was going to sell sugar 
of milk under the guise of the narcotic to another person who 
turned out to be an undercover R.C.M.P. officer. This rather fan-
tastic defence was not simply disbelieved by the trial judge be-
cause he held that lack of knowledge of what one possessed could 
not be a defence under this Act. The decision of the Ontario Court 
of Appeal was reversed by the Supreme Court in a 3-2 decision, 
with by far the most adequate opinions in this whole area. 
Cartwright J." began with the same assumptions he made in 
Rees. Mens rea must be presumed so that the innocent not be con-
victed, and this means actual knowledge is necessary, not just an 
unreasonable mistake. He accepts, though, the existence in the 
law of an exception for public welfare offences, but argued that 
this exception did not apply here, for two reasons. This was not 
analogous to obligations imposed on a businessman carrying on a 
lawful trade, that he insure the quality of his goods, for instance. 
Rather, the activity is one which is almost totally prohibited, and 
thus this is not a regulatory offence. Second, and more important, 
the offence carries a mandatory minimum sentence of six months 
imprisonment. No case could be found where a crime of strict 
responsibility required a jail sentence and Cartwright J. said he 
would require a very clear statement by Parliament before he im-
puted such an intention to it. 
Fauteux J." joined issue on this point. Although he was willing 
to accept some kind of presumption of mens rea, he was not willing 
to confine the exceptions to "public welfare" offences of a trivial 
sort. He said that the scheme of the Act was to make all possession 
prima facie unlawful, to establish "rigid controls" against the 
"social evils" of the drug traffic. The enforcement sections of 
the Act showed the "exceptional vigilance and firmness of Par-
liament . . . to cope with the unusual difficulties standing in the 
way of the realization of its object". He pointed to the many 
restrictions of substantive and procedural principles within the 
Code-the powers of search and seizure, the writ of assistance, 
the burden of proof, the minimum sentences, mandatory deporta-
tion, and so on. Because Parliament wanted the most efficient 
protection possible, the "narrow construction" asked for by the 
accused would defeat these objects, even "to reduce the whole 
Act to waste paper" by requiring proof of knowledge. The draco-
nian injustice of mandatory imprisonment for innocent accuseds 
could be dealt with by discretionary powers, such as the Attorney 
General's stay of prosecution or the free pardon available under 
the royal prerogative. 
3 Writing for the majority, which also included Locke and Rand JJ. 
'3 Whose dissenting opinion was concurred in by Abbott J. 
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This basic difference in attitude which emerges so clearly is 
probably more important than a second legalistic debate about 
the relationship of section 4 and section 17. kauteux J. pointed out 
that section 4, by its plain, literal and grammatical meaning, ab-
solutely prohibited possession of certain drugs, that the definition 
of possession must be developed in the context of this Act, and 
that section 17 furnishes this context. There, a rebuttable presump-
tion of possession of drugs in one's premises was created, which 
could be defeated by proof of lack of knowledge by the accused. 
Fauteux J. asked what sense it made to require the Crown to 
prove actual knowledge where there was personal possession, 
where no words in the statute even hinted at it. How important 
Fauteux J. thought this argument is is interesting, in the light of his 
complete failure to meet an almost exactly analogous contention in 
Rees. He did point out that his conclusion was reached in Morelli' 
by the Ontario Court of Appeal in 1931, and never changed by 
Parliament. 
Cartwright J.'s response is somewhat disappointing. For a time 
he appears to be getting at the correct distinction, between pos-
session of the drug, and the crime of being in possession of the 
drug. Section 17 makes the occupier guilty of the actus reus of 
possession if he knows of its presence on his premises, the same as 
if he has it in his pocket. Under sections 17 and 4 both, though, 
the problem remains whether someone who actually has possession 
in an objective sense is guilty of a crime if he is mistaken about 
the legally essential nature of what he possesses. Unhappily, Cart-
wright J. eventually finds for the accused on the grounds that 
"possession" is not fulfilled if there is not the requisite knowledge. 
Another opportunity to state a general theory of mens rea is 
frittered away. 
On both sides, though, there is complete failure to speak to the 
general reasons in justification of mens rea or strict liability and, 
thus there is almost a total lack of real joinder of issue. Both 
opinions assume that there is a distinction between cases where 
mens rea is necessary and those where it is not, but neither pur-
ports to create any general standard for making the distinction. 
Nor could they intelligently formulate such a standard since at 
no time do they advert to the purposes or aims of either mens rea 
or strict liability. 
Fauteux J. says that the legislature is very concerned that this 
legislation may effectively be enforced but he at no time says why 
mens rea will interfere in this effort or, if it will, how important 
are the marginal gains in enforcement by comparison with the 
losses engendered by strict liability. Cartwright J. looks at specific 
facets of this legislation which distinguish it from those convention-
" [1932] 3 D.L.R. 611. 
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ally called "public welfare" offences, carrying strict liability, but 
this kind of analysis must of necessity be inconclusive. Until he 
tells us why strict liability is necessary, we cannot know the in-
stances in which these reasons make it necessary. Unless we know 
why mens rea should be a precondition to imprisonment, we can-
not justify pointing to a mandatory jail sentence as the basis for 
our conclusion that mens rea is necessary for this offence. Cart-
wright J. and Fauteux J. continually refer to the question, does the 
legislation impliedly exclude mens rea or not? They have not 
sufficiently realized that it is the courts which have to make the 
decision about mens rea, that where the statute is silent Parliament 
has not already decided for them, and that they must give intelli-
gently-founded reasons for the conclusions at which they arrive.' 
The third and final case in this trilogy is R. v. King," one in 
which the opinions appear terribly confused, perhaps because 
neither Cartwright J. nor Fauteux J. participated, but also sympto-
matic of a general decline in quality in the Sixties. The defendant 
was charged with driving a vehicle while his ability was impaired 
by a drug, contrary to section 222 and 223 of the Code. There 
was no doubt he had done so but his defence was that the drug 
was administered by his dentist, that he was unaware of its 
properties, and after he had begun driving its after-effects suddenly 
made him unconscious. The trial judge found against him, the 
Court of Appeal for him, and the Supreme Court agreed with the 
latter by a 5-0 vote." 
The first opinion is that of Taschereau J. who also concurs 
with Ritchie J.'s opinion, which is strange because they disagree in 
their reasons. Taschereau J. tries to distinguish intention from 
mens rea, saying that one must have an act proceeding from a 
person's free will. There can be no voluntary act of a driver 
when a doctor injects the latter with a drug of whose effects on 
his mind he is unaware. On the other hand, if a person voluntarily 
takes liquor or drugs of whose effect he is aware and then drives, 
lack of intention at this second point will not be a defence. 
3 Fortunately the British Columbia Court of Appeal used Beaver, supra, 
footnote 31, as an authority to extend the mens rea principle to the "im-
porting" section of Narcotic Control Act where "possession" was not in 
point: R. v. Boyer (1968), 4 C.R.N.S. 127. 
" Supra, footnote 12. 
" Locke J., writing and Judson J. concurring with him, did not decide 
on the basis of principle, but rather because they believed that the trial 
judge's findings of fact precluded holding that the defendant was unaware 
of the properties of the drug and that it would likely impair him. Because 
the Crown did not appeal on this basis, though, they would dismiss its ap-
peal. For these reasons we would have to characterize their positions as 
neutral concerning the question of the mental element in this kind of driving 
offence. The other judges, who did get to this issue of principle that had 
been debated at the lower level, were able to hold the defence was made 
out despite the ambiguous factual situation of earlier warnings, a signed 
release, amnesia, etc. 
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Taschereau J. says there can be no conviction here as an offence,
because "there can be no actus reus unless it is the result of a 
willing mind at liberty to make a definite choice or decision". 
What Taschereau J. appears to have been getting at was a 
distinction between intention and voluntary act, corresponding 
somewhat to mens rea and actus reus respectively, one which had 
developed in certain recent Commonwealth cases of automatism. 
Automatic states of unconsciousness preclude any decision to en-
gage in conduct at all, a much more basic defect in a person's 
mental capacity than his ignorance of the circumstances or con-
sequences of his conduct." Such defects have been held to be 
more comparable to forced bodily movements or spasmodic mus-
cular reactions than to simple mistake or accident. The signi-
ficance of this for our purposes is that, while mens rea offences 
would necessarily include some reference to this cognitive in-
capacity, the opposite was not true. Certain offences might be 
read as requiring conscious voluntary action by the defendant 
while not excusing such conduct because of further ignorance 
of circumstances or result. In fact, such had been the apparent 
conclusion in a recent English decision about driving legisla-
tion." This case raised this very important question in a rather 
different fashion, because of coalescence of two different actions 
in the offence, drinking and then driving. Taschereau J.'s response 
is not only quite inadequate, but it is also the only explicit handling 
of the problem in the Supreme Court." 
" See Hart, Acts of Will and Responsibility, from Punishment and 
Responsibility (1968), Ch. 4. 
9 Hill v. Baxter (1958), 1 Q.B. 277. 
4 Strangely enough the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have de-
cided that automatism can be a complete excuse in the criminal law with-
out ever having mentioned it, in the case of R. v. Bleta, [1964] S.C.R. 561. 
Why this is so can be gathered from the following passage from the Sas-
katchewan Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Hartridge (1966), 57 D.L.R. 
(2d) 332, at p. 348: 
"I think it must be taken that both the Court of Appeal for Ontario and 
the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the defence of automatism 
in R. v. Bleta, [1964] 2 C.C.C. 190, 41 C.R. 377, [1964] 1 O.R. 485 
(C.A.), and [1965] 1 C.C.C. 1, 44 C.R. 193, [1964] S.C.R. 561. In that 
case the accused was charged with non-capital murder. At the trial his 
defence was that in the course of the fight between himself and the 
deceased, he was knocked and pushed to the sidewalk and his head 
struck the pavement. As a result of the injuries so sustained, it was 
contended that the stabbing of the deceased was an unconscious act 
for which the accused could not be held criminally responsible. The jury
brought in a verdict of not guilty and an appeal was taken by the Crown. 
The Crown based its appeal on the ground that certain evidence that had 
been admitted was not admissible. The Court of Appeal gave effect to 
this argument and ordered a new trial. A further appeal was taken to 
the Supreme Court of Canada, where the appeal was allowed and the 
verdict of acquittal restored. While the latter judgment is an authoritative 
pronouncement in respect to the issue upon which the appeal was de-
cided, the restoration of the verdict of acquittal must be construed as 
acceptance of the defence of automatism as disclosed by the evidence." 
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The offence, here, consists of the conjunction of conduct 
(driving) and a condition (impairment). King knowingly took the 
drug which caused the impairment and then voluntarily began to 
drive the car. However, the combination of impairment and 
driving occurred at a moment when King became unconscious. 
Though the state of automatism does seem to obtain here, it is 
the unintended and accidental result of voluntary action. The 
distinctive and confusing facet of this case is that the consequence 
of the earlier conduct is itself a subjective effect in the mental 
condition of the accused. Hence Taschereau J. was a little too 
hasty in saying that intention, which refers to consequences, was 
unimportant in this case. 
Nor is this simply a matter of precise analysis since the case 
could have led to a more adequate understanding of the mens rea 
doctrine. Since it was faced with a state which fits somewhere 
between the excuse of involuntary conduct on the one hand and 
accident and mistake on the other, the court could have demon-
strated the inconsistency in the policy of founding certain offences 
on strict liability and still requiring a voluntary act as part of the 
actus reus. The evil in a strict liability case is that we punish 
someone who cannot meaningfully be said to have chosen to break 
the criminal law because of his ignorance. If we are willing to 
do this, it is hard to see why we single out as a distinctive defect 
an inability to choose to act, as a result of automatism or other-
wise. 
The final judgment, that of Ritchie J.,' does not have to deal 
with that point because it resolves the mens rea against strict 
liability issue in favour of the former. The basis for this decision 
was quite legalistic,' but probably right. However, the dangers of 
judicial concern for practical policy in the face of basic principle, 
especially when expressed in obiter dicta, is amply illustrated by 
the last part of his opinion. Ritchie J. seemed to establish a rebut-
table presumption of the natural consequences of our conduct, one 
which refers to reasonable grounds for expecting impairment, ap-
The unanimous judgment of the court was given by Ritchie J. and was 
concurred in by Cartwright, Fauteux, Judson, Spence, Martland, and Hall 
JJ. Because this is a very important substantive issue, and the court's de-
cision is decisive for it, I included this case in each of the tables, on the 
assumption the judges realized they were making this choice of policy and 
principle. 
41 Concurred in by Martland J. 
4 He cites the same English cases as did Cartwright J. earlier and fol-
lows Beaver in the strong presumption in favour of mens rea. Instead of 
trying to develop a rationale justifying and defining the exceptions, he 
quotes and applies a test from Halsbury, "is it criminal in any real sense?" 
and holds that it is, because of the great danger to others and because 
of the Beaver criterion of mandatory imprisonment (here for subsequent 
offences). He cites an Australian case in support (Proudman v. Dayman 
(1941), 67 C.L.R. 536), and then half4heartedly distinguishes the English 
precedent, Armstrong v. Clark, [1957] 2 Q.B. 391. 
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pealing to Holmes, The Common Law," for justification of an 
objective standard about matters of common experience which an 
individual must know at his peril. All of this rather dangerous lan-
guage is apparently designed to head off any reliance on this deci-
sion by those who would say they voluntarily drank liquor and then 
drove without realizing their ability had become impaired. Although 
Ritchie J. speaks of a rebuttable presumption that men know the 
natural consequences of their conduct, he also refers to reason-
able grounds for expecting impairment, and quotes Holmes to the 
effect that "common experience" must be known at an individual's 
peril. The fact that this reasoning remains in an authoritative 
majority opinion in a Supreme Court decision, makes it available 
to a future Crown Attorney who might want to import all or 
most of the D.P.P. v. Smith" objective test of mens rea into 
Canada. Ritchie J. does not refer at all to the implications for 
his position of O'Grady v. Sparling," which, as we shall see, had 
just laid down the standard of advertent recklessness for "criminal 
negligence in driving", an offence immediately contiguous to this 
one in the Code. Nor does he seem aware of the medical concept 
of pathological reaction to alcohol or the real lay ignorance about 
certain drugs, and the injustice his unnecessary dicta will work in 
relation to them. 
The lower courts of Canada have been faced with the task of 
translating and elaborating the implications of these cases for the 
vast number of statutory offences which are created. There are two 
important aspects to this function: first, can we articulate a stan-
dard by which we may intelligently distinguish the mens rea and 
strict liability offences; second, are these the only two alternatives 
to the problem of individual guilt, or is there a third and perhaps 
better solution for the "public welfare" offence? 
It is fair to say that the intellectual case for strict liability is 
very debatable," but it could be argued that the principle was 
4 (1881), p. 57. 
"[1961] A.C. 290. 
"Supra, footnote 10. 
"The case for strict liability depends on a set of distinct but related as-
sumptions which, when read together, indicate pretty clearly the kind of 
statutory offences for which they are relevant. The purpose of the offences 
is the protection of the safety and welfare of a large potential group of vic-
tims. This requires the attainment of a high degree of care in performance 
of the activity which engenders these risks. Strict liability will help attain 
this higher quality of performance in several ways. If any mistake or 
mishap will attract liability, there will be a great incentive to take all pos-
sible steps to avoid any such mistakes or mishaps. In a negative sense, strict 
liability removes a possible defence which could be fraudulently used and 
thus enhances general deterrence by announcing to the world that no loop-
hole exists in the legislation. Finally, because the need for such care is 
associated primarily with special, defined activities (driving a car, selling 
meat, handling certain products, etc.), the possibility of strict liability will 
exclude from the field of such activity those who are not confident of their 
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established in the fabric of the common law of criminal guilt and 
the Supreme Court should not have tried to root it out." However, 
if the judges were to continue the principle in these first cases at 
the Supreme Court level, they were under an obligation to make 
sense of it, to formulate a theory which pointed out the relevant 
facets of different offences for making the decision about strict 
liability. There are hints in the court's opinions about the signi-
ficance of certain factors-mandatory imprisonment, the need for 
protection of public safety, the essentially civil, rather than crim-
inal character of the offence-but there is no systematic state-
ment of these factors in any integrated meaningful fashion. 
As a consequence, it is obvious that the lower courts have had 
great difficulty in discerning the true path of the law in this area. 
It is true that where the statutes are closely analogous to those 
dealt with in the principal cases, little difficulty may be en-
countered." Yet the vast majority of these cases deal with different 
ability to avoid all mistakes, however blameless. 
Of course, it has been argued that such a case for strict liability has 
not and cannot be empirically demonstrated. On the contrary, analysis 
might reveal a tendency towards lesser care, either because even the greatest 
care will be no defence, or because conviction of the innocent creates 
cynicism and disrespect for the dictates of the law. The response to the 
latter would be that administrative discretion would exclude the prosecution 
(and thus conviction) of those clearly without fault. Moreover, the cost 
of criminal conviction of even the innocents who do slip through the net of 
administrative judgment is very low. If they are without fault, they will be 
sentenced only to pay a fine, which will be small because of their innocence. 
These essentially regulatory offences which involve conduct creating the risk 
of harm, and rarely involve personal injury or property damage to a par-
ticular victim, do not carry the stigma usually associated with criminal 
conviction. They are not "real crimes" in the eyes of the public. 
Again these arguments are not unambiguously valid. If evidence of in-
nocence is relevant to sentence, then this contravenes the argument that 
proof or disproof of fault just is too great a burden in time and money for 
the vast bulk of regulatory offences. It introduces too much discretion into 
sentencing as well as prosecutions, decisions which are made by lower 
government officials. The use of the criminal law process necessarily at-
tracts some of the stigma and its effects on reputation which pervades its 
new traditional uses. Moreover, deliberately to try to minimize this effect 
is to sacrifice the best instrument for implementing these standards of con-
duct, all for the easier imposition of relatively insignificant penalties. And 
if, as is often the case, the real deterrent in public regulatory offences stems 
from subsequent loss of licences and other such appurtenances, then the 
imposition of these penalties indiscriminately on the blameless and the 
blameworthy does raise serious problems of justice. 
" Though a very sophisticated attempt was made by the County Court 
judge in R. v. Patterson, [1964] 1 O.R. 628. 
"8 King is followed in Rushton (1967), 1 C.C.C. 87 and Liston (1967),
1 C.C.C. 87 (a different drug under s. 223) and McCormack (1963), 1 
C.C.C. 359 (Sask. C.A.) (s. 222). Beaver was followed in Lainer (1968),
29 C.C.C. 297, Hall (1961), 131 C.C.C. 172 and Guiney (1961), 130 
C.C.C. 407, the latter two dealing with possession for purposes of trafficking,
and in Boyer, supra, footnote 35, which dealt with importing drugs under 
the same Act. Rees was used in Stundon (1962), 40 W.W.R. 656, dealing
with the same section, and in Watson (1964), 51 M.P.R. 103 where a 
different statute (selling intoxicants to a minor) also used the word "know-
ingly". 
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regulatory offences which raise the same issue of principle. As to 
these, the Supreme Court's efforts have been extremely unhelpful. 
In several cases, they are not even cited as the lower court 
rests content with English or other Canadian authority." 
Perhaps the best example of lack of guidance from the court 
is the use of King in driving offences. Opposite conclusions were 
reached in Wehage" and Patterson,"both of which dealt with the 
provincial highway traffic offence of driving on the wrong side 
of the centre line. The latter held that this was a driving offence 
and that the strong presumption in favour of mens rea was not 
rebutted. The former argued, though, that King dealt essentially 
with a criminal offence relating to driving. This was a provincial 
offence, regulating traffic for safety purposes, and mens rea is 
relevant only to sentence. Even in such a closely related offence, 
the Supreme Court gives no guidance at all, and essential ad 
hominem inconclusive arguments are all that are left. 
Pattersonwas overruled by McIver," where the Ontario Court 
of Appeal held that careless driving did not require proof of mens 
rea. One of the opinions (that of Porter C.J.) suggested that this 
offence was one of strict liability. The other opinion (MacKay 
J.'s), applied his distinctive theory that fault could be available as 
a defence if the accused proved that he committed the offence 
despite all reasonable care. The case was appealed by the accused 
to the Supreme Court which dismissed the appeal but felt the only 
issue of importance was the Mann" problem. Because it chose not 
to elaborate on the implications of King, our highway traffic law 
continues without intelligent direction from the court. 
To a certain extent this lack of influence is attributable, or so 
I believe, to a tendency in Beaver et al. to speak of the decision for 
or against mens rea as essentially a legislative one. The legislation 
4 This is true in Rouy, MacCallum and Associates, [1967] 1 O.R. 488 
under the Atomic Energy Control Act, where strict liability is found, after 
a rather nice, analysis of the great danger, tight administrative regulation, 
limitation of use to a very few experts, and the conclusion that they should 
act at their peril. A similar conclusion was reached in Perreau (1967), 60 
W.W.R. 382 and Babiak (1967), 60 W.W.R. 689 ("purple gas") and In-
dustrial Tankers, [1968] 2 O.R. 142 (water pollution) with no reference 
at all to the Supreme Court trilogy. On the other hand, in Mussalem 
(1967), 62 W.W.R. 383 (supplying liquor to minor), V. K. Mason Con-
struction Ltd. (1968), 3 C.C.C. 62 (construction safety) and Pierce Fish-
eries (1969), 4 D.L.R. (3d) 80 (selling undersized lobster), different courts 
all arrived at the requirement of mens rea, with no real help from the 
court. They cite Beaver (or Watts & Gaunt in the third case) but only to 
get to the English principle-essentially Sherras v. De Rutzen, [1895] 1 
Q.B. 918-which they then proceed to apply as their basic reason. Pierce 
Fisheries was very recently reversed by the Supreme Court, by a nine-man 
bench, Ritchie J. writing the majority opinion, and Cartwright J. delivering 
a lone dissent. See (1970), 5 C.C.C. 193. 
so (1962), 41 W.W.R. 362. 
' Supra, footnote 47. 
52 [1965] 2 O.R. 475. 
"3 Mann v. The Queen, [1956] S.C.R. 238. 
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is said to exclude mens rea either explicitly or implicitly, and the 
search is on for the legislative intent, rather than for reasons which 
justify a judicial decision one way or the other. Of course, this 
is myth and rhetoric, as is shown by a debate which was carried 
on in the Supreme Court, and in the lower courts, concerning the 
nature of mens rea. Although Cartwright J. had earlier insisted 
that mens rea was negated by an honest mistake with reasonable-
ness being merely evidence of bona fides, Ritchie J. disagreed in 
King as we have seen. The dispute has carried over into the lower 
courts, with little or no reference to what the legislature might 
have thought. 
Ritchie J.'s dictum has carried the day, without discussion, 
in the immediate area of impaired driving. In Liston," the court 
found reasonable and honest ignorance of the impairing effects 
of a drug. However, in Rushton," the Ritchie J. distinction re-
sulted in conviction. Though there was no doubt of the honesty of 
the defendant's belief, he had not introduced any evidence to rebut 
the presumption that he should have known, from common ex-
perience, of the drug's effects. 
What makes this development of wider interest is the sug-
gestion that has emerged from Australian cases and literature" that 
the best resolution of the competing interests in the regulatory 
offence context is the requirement that the accused disprove the 
presumption that reasonable care would have avoided his prima 
facie offence. By definition this requires the kind of care which 
we want under the statute; it eases the problems and costs of 
proving some kind of fault, while avoiding most, if not all, of the 
injustice of convicting the truly innocent. Unfortunately, neither 
Cartwright J. nor Ritchie J. spoke to this problem in their dis-
cussions of the nature of mens rea and neither sought to isolate 
the specific "public welfare" offence for the treatment of negligence. 
Happily our lower courts have been aware of and have 
thoughtfully discussed this alternative. Unfortunately their argu-
ments and conclusions are not terribly conclusive. In Industrial 
Tankers Ltd.," negligence is rejected and strict liability is im-
posed, essentially because of the uncertainty which would be 
created by introducing distinctions into mens rea. However, there 
is already a very confused and difficult distinction between mens 
rea and strict liability. This proposal merely suggests the sub-
stitution of negligence for the latter which can only improve the dis-
tinction. This was tacitly recognized by the judgment in V. K. Mason 
Construction Ltd." but Lieff J. finally rests on some relatively 
" Supra, footnote 48. 
ibid. 
0 See Morris and Howard, Strict Responsibility, in Studies in Criminal 
Law (1964), p. 197. 
" Supra, footnote 49. 58 Ibid. 
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unhelpful statutory language. Hence, he does not persuade the 
Nova Scotia court in Pierce Fisheries,"which has one of the best 
analyses of the problem in the whole of the Canadian law. This 
case recognizes that this is a problem of basic principle in the crim-
inal law and that the arguments for strict liability are often spuri-
ous. However, it eventually comes down to legislative arguments 
and rejects the "half-way house" of negligence. There is insuf-
ficient recognition of the established facts of strict liability in "pub-
lic welfare" offences in Canadian law, and thus no contribution to a 
mutation of strict liability into negligence where it does obtain. 
The one judge who seems perfectly aware of the implications of 
this "halfway house", the Australian development of it, and its im-
portance for criminal law in this area is Mr. Justice MacKay of 
the Ontario Court of Appeal. He has systematically formulated 
his theory in opinions in King," McIvor" and McAuslane62 with 
explicit reference to the authorities. Unfortunately, the Supreme 
Court has never even mentioned his argument notwithstanding 
the fact that it has heard and decided appeals from both King 
and McIver." In this, as in many other corners of this area of law, 
what the Supreme Court would have us do remains moot. 
B. The Reach of Fault: Herein of Mistake of Fact and of Law. 
Once a court reaches the decision that the presumption of mens 
rea is not rebutted in a specific offence, it is next necessary to see 
whether any particular kinds of mistake are excluded from this 
doctrine. An example of this kind of problem is Rees" where it 
was argued that, even if mens rea was generally required as to the 
elements of the offence, this should not be true of the specific 
issue of the age of the victim. In the absence of clear authoritative 
judgment of the legislature, the rational way of deciding such a 
question is to consider whether the gains to be achieved by such a 
course outweigh the costs resulting from the narrowing of the 
principle. 
A general, recurring, such problem is whether mistakes of law 
warrant the defence of lack of mens rea. At the common law, it 
was traditional to regard such mistakes as not an excuse in 
criminal law and section 19 of the Criminal Code codifies this 
position." It is obvious that the basic policies underlying the re-
quirement of blameworthiness for criminal guilt render it prima 
" Ibid. 
'OR. v. King (1961), 129 C.C.C. 391 (Ont. C.A.). 
01 Supra, footnote 52, at p. 480. 
62 [1968] 1 O.R. 209. 
- [1966] S.C.R. 254. 
"Supra, footnote 18. 
61 "Ignorance of the law by a person who commits an offence is not an 
excuse for committing that offence". Section 19 of Criminal Code, supra, 
footnote 4. 
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facie unfair to convict someone of an offence under a statute 
which he did not know existed. Nonetheless, this injustice has 
traditionally been supported for two reasons. 
First of all, it may be very difficult to make a rational decision 
about the presence or absence of the relevant knowledge of the 
criminal law. Unlike matters of fact, which are related to a specific 
occasion, proof or disproof of ignorance of the law might require 
investigation of all of the possible opportunities the defendant 
might have had for learning about the law in his previous life.66 
Not only will the costs of avoiding this injustice be great, but 
also the degree of unfairness in the doctrine may be minimal. 
Because the criminal law represents the moral values of a com-
munity, a person who is in breach of them can and should be 
treated as blameworthy if he disregards them," even if he shows 
that it was impossible for him to be aware of the implementing 
law." 
It is probable that these considerations were in the minds of 
judges who created the doctrine, and only in the rare case of 
someone who newly entered the jurisdiction and was unaware 
of its mores could the defendant legitimately claim any injustice." 
In a modern administrative state with its proliferation of technical 
and poorly-publicized regulations, the balance may well have 
shifted sufficiently to warrant some re-examination of the doctrine, 
and an adventurous court has many legitimate legal avenues for 
achieving this. As regards its statutory foundation, the doctrine is 
presently incorporated only in the Code while most of the situa-
tions where a claim of ignorance could fairly be made arise in 
federal or provincial regulatory legislation which is quite uncon-
nected with the Code. An exception has been developed in the 
case of offences arising under subordinate legislation which has 
not yet been published, in an opinion which intelligently differ-
entiates such a law from a statute which must be enacted only after 
several readings in Parliament." Unfortunately, this has been the 
sole example of judicial rethinking of the basic doctrine up to now." 
This outline of the background of the doctrine is necessary 
in order to understand and assess the contribution made by our 
66 See Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed., 1960), pp. 
378-379. 
7 Ibid., p. 382 et seq. 
6 A classic example being R. v. Bailey (1800), 168 E.R. 651, where 
the law was passed while accused was on a ship on the ocean, and the 
offence was committed on the ship.
6 
9Examples are R. v. Esop (1836), 173 E.R. 203; R. v. Barronet 
(1852), 169 E.R. 633. 
'o See R. v. Ross (1944), 84 C.C.C. 107; R. v. Lim Chin Aik, [1963] 
A.C. 160. 
" Though the U.S. Supreme Court did see the peculiar injustice in the 
"ignorance of the law is no excuse" doctrine in the case of omissions, in 
Lambert v. California (1957), 355 U.S. 225. 
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Supreme Court which has so far been confined to the area of 
"claim of right". Somewhere between the paradigm cases of pure 
ignorance of law and pure ignorance of fact is the well-established 
common law defence of "claim of right", especially in connection 
with theft and other property defences." Such a defence is required 
if for no other reason than that the distinction between law and 
fact is itself a somewhat ambiguous point on a rather shadowy 
spectrum." The effort of the court to give some content to the 
"claim of right" defence, and to limit the mistake of law exception 
to the basic mens rea principle in the light of relevant objectives 
of both doctrines can only be described as an intellectual disaster. 
The two early cases where the basic issues were first raised 
were Watts and Gaunt' and Shymkowich." Both arose out of the 
same factual background, the salvage of timber logs in British 
Columbia, and in both the Supreme Court reversed the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, the second time when the Court of 
Appeal followed the Supreme Court's first decision. In Watts and 
Gaunt, the defendants were British Columbia beachcombers who 
collected logs belonging to the lumber companies, and customarily 
received forty per cent of their value as salvage from the owner 
whose mark the logs bore. When the defendants recovered logs 
belonging to a company, one which had followed the practice for 
" See R. v. Hall (1828), 172 E.R. 477; R. v. Bernhard, [1938] 2 K.B. 
264 (C.C.A.). 
" An example may best show what I mean about this inherently tenuous 
character of the distinction between law and fact. A person living in a 
jurisdiction, who has been married before, may go through another mar-
riage ceremony and be prosecuted for bigamy. He may say that he does 
not know it is a crime to try to be married twice in the jurisdiction and that 
he thought polygamy legal. Such a defence would fail under, the old rule 
now incorporated in section 19 of the Code. As we have seen, a person is 
supposed to be aware of the legal standards of conduct in the place where 
he lives, especially where these standards are more or less coextensive with 
accepted mores within the community. On the other hand, though, three 
other defences might be asserted: first, the defendant thought his first wife 
dead (mistake of fact); second, the defendant thought his first marriage 
ended by an out-of-jurisdiction divorce which he mistakenly believed valid 
(a mistake about divorce law); third, he felt his divorce was valid because 
of a belief he had acquired domicile where he got the divorce (a mistake 
about how the legal standard was to be applied to the agreed-to facts). 
Hence, besides distinguishing between the general standards of criminal 
law and the factual accounts of what has happened, we must also dis-
tinguish (1) the application of these general standards to specific cases; 
(2) the legal character of general rules in other areas of law, and (3) the 
validity of specific judgments about individual status, property rights, etc., 
under the latter rules, where these are necessary to the rules of criminal 
law. The point of the claim of right defence is to equate mistakes about 
civil law, where they become relevant to a criminal offence, to mistakes of 
fact and thus to allow them to negative mens rea. Not only is it completely
unrealistic to expect ordinary citizens to be aware of the intricacies of 
civil law but it is also unnecessary because we have civil courts to dispose
of the essentially private disputes which these cases invariably involve. 
' 4Supra, footnote 30. 
' Supra, footnote 21. 
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five years, the company demanded possession of the logs. The de-
fendants refused until they got the money and were prosecuted 
and convicted under section 394(b). The British Columbia Court 
of Appeal held that proof of "fraud" was not necessary under 
section 394(b) (as it was under section 394(a)) and upheld the 
conviction. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed and ordered 
acquittal. 
Most of the judgments are short, sparse, and confused. Cart-
wright J. simply says that mens rea was essential here and did not 
obtain, without saying why. Taschereau J. said that the defendants 
had an honest impression the owners had tacitly consented; Rand 
J. held that they had a reasonablebelief in the permission to sal-
vage the logs for forty per cent. Of course, this ignores the fact that 
the defendants had no such impression of the owner's position after 
the latter's demand. Kellock, Fauteux, and Locke JJ. appear to say 
that the existence of the custom created a right in the defendants 
to retain the logs until the owners paid compensation. Of course, 
if this is the case, the defendants are not mistaken at all; they have 
committed no offence because they were perfectly within their 
legal rights to retain the logs. Yet, although a contractual right to 
compensation may arise on these facts, it is hard to see how the 
defendants rightfully claimed a possessory lien to enforce it. 
Estey J.'s judgment, while longer, is so only because it re-
produces the facts and the statute. He said that the grammatical 
structure and legislative history of the statute led to the conclusion 
that "fraud" is required for every sub-section, including section 
394(b). Even if it does not, the presumption of mens rea is not 
excluded because he feels the nature of this offence is simply to 
prevent theft, and not to promote public safety, health, or morality. 
Estey J. approvingly cites Bank of N.S.W. v. Piper"for the propo-
sition that an "honest and reasonable belief in the existence of 
facts" may excuse. All of this ignored what should have been ob-
vious, that at the time of the company's demand, there was no 
mistake about the relevant facts, the only misapprehension (if it 
was one at all) relating to the defendant's legal right to retain 
the logs on these facts. In fact, Estey J.'s judgment at one point 
appears to state that the defendants did have the right to a lien 
here, despite the whole tenor of his opinion which is concerned 
with mens rea in this situation. 
However this situation be characterized, though, it seems ob-
vious that the policy behind section 19 should not apply to convict 
the defendants. They were aware of their obligations under the 
criminal statutes and their doubts about an essentially private dis-
pute concerned the proprietary and contractual rights to possesion 
upon which the law of theft must depend. This was an obvious 
16 [1897] A.C. 383 (P.C.). 
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area for which the common law doctrine of claim of right was 
designed and yet it was not even mentioned. This did not hurt the 
defendants, Watts and Gaunt, but it was unfortunate for Shym-
kowich, the accused in the next case. 
In this case, a company leased a booming ground from the 
provincial government in the Fraser River and marked it with 
periodic "dolphins". Within this ground, it had a boom full of 
logs which was tied to the shore. The defendant went out looking 
for logs and saw two of them floating in the booming ground, 
though somewhat removed from the boom. He took them out, 
sold them to a third party, and was prosecuted. He claimed that 
he thought he was doing nothing wrong and the trial judge was 
willing to find he thought these logs might have floated into the 
booming ground from up the river. The judge also characterized 
the sale as essentially the assignment of the forty per cent salvage 
rights referred to earlier. The British Columbia Court of Appeal 
relied upon Watts and Gaunt to uphold the acquittal here, and 
the Supreme Court, by a vote of 4-1, found Shymkowich guilty 
of theft of the logs under section 396. 
Rand J." characterized the defence as one of mistake of law 
and referred to Kenny" and section 19 to show this would not 
work. He recognized that, especially in this area, the distinction 
between law and fact was difficult. Though he characterized 
ownership as "factual", albeit dependent on law, he said that one 
must distinguish between justifying an act as authorized by law 
and a bona fide belief in a property interest. Yet surely Shymko-
wich's mistake was simply as to the reach of the custom-founded 
defence already upheld in Watts and Gaunt, and this belief in turn 
rested upon the mistaken belief about where the logs came from. 
Ownership is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the 
right to take property, and thus should not be the critical factor 
on which belief about the right turns." The trouble with Rand J.'s 
distinction is that it takes no account of the relevant policies in the 
area, something which is particularly unfortunate when there was 
no binding authority requiring him to draw the line where he did. 
Estey J."o also held Shymkowich guilty but for other reasons. 
He characterized the mistake as essentially one of fact, and then 
said that the accused did not have an honest and reasonable be-
lief in a set of facts which could excuse him. He argues that only 
if the defendant thought they were lost or abandoned could he 
have a right to take them, and he could not have this belief when 
they were in the possession or control of the person in the boom-
" Taschereau J. concurring. 
* Outlines of Criminal Law (1952 ed.), p. 48. 
" There is a direct and classic authority for this proposition-R. v. 
Boden (1844), 174 E.R. 863. 
so Fauteux J. concurring. 
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ing ground. In his reasoning, he appears to distinguish his own 
Watts and Gaunt decision on the grounds that that was a question 
of the relative rights between owner and salvager (something 
which is totally inconsistent with his reasoning there about mis-
take of fact). Yet he ignores two salient points: first, the trial 
judge held that the defendant believed the logs in the booming 
ground had drifted down the river; second, the defendant also 
believed he had a right to salvage someone else's drifting logs 
from a booming ground into which they had floated. Since Estey J. 
was supposed to be bound by these trial findings about the de-
fendant's mistaken state of mind, he clearly failed to deal with the 
salient issue raised by this case, the continued existence of the 
common law colour of right defence to theft offences under the 
Code (a defence supported and reiterated by the very texts" the 
majority were citing to their own purposes). 
Nor can we say that this issue was not raised on appeal since 
it was the basis of Locke J.'s vigorous dissent. He cited the rele-
vant texts and cases' which showed that the definition of theft in-
corporated a negative reference to "colour of right" and concluded 
that this carried over into the Code. Section 19 was held inappli-
cable not because this was not a question of law, but because there 
is no offence of theft at all if items are taken or kept under a mis-
taken belief of one's proprietary rights to them. Surely Locke J. 
is right in his assumption that the civil law defining the various 
rights to property is too complex to justify imposing the risk of 
criminal prosecution on one who acts in a good faith belief in 
the legality of his possession. The civil courts are available and 
should be used for resolving such disputes. 
It is fair to say that these cases, to the extent that they are 
significant, have badly muddied the developing law in Canada. The 
same court which requires a presumption of mens rea as a protec-
tion of the citizen against conviction and punishment has given no 
hint that it perceives any inconsistency in an extreme interpretation 
of the opposite presumption that ignorance of the law is no ex-
cuse. A court which perceived this inconsistency, and realized that 
the ignorance of the law doctrine was developed in a special his-
torical situation might have used these cases as the starting point 
in the necessary task of reconciling the doctrine with the policies 
of the mens rea principle to the extent that this is consistent with 
the language of section 19. For example, the doctrine refers to 
"ignorance of the law" but I suppose that most of the cases which 
actually arise are better described as "mistake of law". They in-
volve defendants who know of the existence of a law which makes 
" Kenny, op. cit., footnote 78, p. 241; Halsbury, Laws of England (2nd 
ed., 1939-42), vol. 11, p. 497, and Stephen, History of the Criminal Law 
of England. vol. 3 (1883), p. 124. 
82 Esp. Bernhard, supra, footnote 72. 
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certain conduct criminal but who are mistaken about its precise 
application. They have often taken reasonable steps to learn of the 
legality of their conduct and may have relied on the very plausible 
advice of lawyers before acting." Neither the purpose nor the 
language of the basic rule seems to require the exclusion of the 
defence. However, unfortunately, our courts have so far not chosen 
to make such a distinction and thus advance the policies of the 
mens rea principle." 
There are two intellectually defensible attempts to come to grips 
with these problems in Canadian law, although their attention 
to principle is considerably hampered by the necessity of dealing 
with the authority of Shymkowich." In Pace,8 6 the accused was a 
cook in the R.C.A.F. who took a cake home rather than see it 
go into the garbage. His conviction for theft was upheld by the 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal largely on the authority of Shym-
kowich. It appeared that the accused did not believe the cake was 
abandoned such that he became the "owner" of it; rather he be-
lieved that it was of no value to the owner, that the latter would 
not object to his taking it, and thus he acted with the honest belief 
that he had a right to take the cake. The court held that this de-
fence, even if established on the facts, would not be valid in law. 
It followed Rand and Taschereau JJ. in Shymkowich to the effect 
that mistake of law was irrelevant in theft cases by reason of 
section 19, except where it related to ownership where it was 
8 An American case, Long v. State (1949), 65 A.2d 489, has made this 
a defence. 
8 4 The leading Canadian cases are R. v. Dalley (1957), 118 C.C.C. 116 
(Ont. C.A.) and R. v. Myers Cattle Company and Oliphant (1965), 3 C.C.C. 
87 (Sask. C.A.). One of the best critiques of the whole problem is Brett, 
Mistake of Law as a Criminal Defence (1966), 5 Melbourne L. Rev. 179. 
' Supra, foonote 21. Two further cases decided by the Supreme Court 
itself totally ignored the complexities of the problem, and the implications 
of its own two precedents, and focused simply on the facts and addresses 
to the jury. In both Laroche, supra, footnote 17, and Lemire, supra, foot-
note 14, the court reversed the Ontario and Quebec Courts of Appeal 
respectively and found against the accuseds' claim of good faith belief in 
legal authority. In each case there was wrongful misappropriation of money 
by the accused and in both cases it was under the direction of the accuseds' 
superiors. The court rejected the defence on the facts, tacitly assuming (or 
so it seems) its general validity if the existence of the belief is supported 
by the evidence. As usual, it does not speak to the legal question involved 
when it dismisses for want of substantial injustice. No mention is made of 
the contrasting conclusions to be drawn from Watts, supra, footnote 30, 
and Shymkowich, supra, footnote 21, about whether a mistake of law 
could ever be a defence as the Courts of Appeal believe (again without 
mention of these). Of interest are the divisions in these cases, which largely 
conform to our pattern, though the reasons are purely fact-oriented. 
In Laroche, Judson J. wrote for the majority in favour of conviction, 
Fauteux, Abbott, and Martland JJ. concurring. Cartwright and Spence JJ. 
wrote dissenting opinions, the latter one is joined in by Hall J. In Lemire, 
Martland J. wrote for the majority convicting the accused, with Fauteux, 
Abbott and Ritchie JJ. agreeing, while Taschereau and Cartwright JJ. dis-
sented, Spence J. concurring in the latter's opinion. 
86 (1965), 3 C.C.C. 55. 
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essentially a "factual" matter. Though Locke J. dissented on this 
point, Estey and Fauteux JJ. were neutral, and this court pre-
ferred Rand J.'s view (and rejected the text writers)." The opinion 
is an extremely good analytical dissection of the issues and treat-
ment of the relevant authorities, both case and textual. 
A contrary conclusion was reached, a year later, by the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in Howson." Here the accused towed a person's 
car from a private lot where it was trespassing and the court 
agreed that Howson had a right to do so. However, the latter re-
fused to deliver up the car until towing and storage charges were 
paid, as he did not have a right to do. The Court of Appeal re-
versed a conviction for theft, because of the defendant's bona fide 
and honest belief in his legal right to retain the car till the charges 
were paid. The court held that the theft was excused by a belief 
in a claim of right which was valid, even if misconceived, and 
whether or not the misconception related to the facts, law, or mix-
ture of both. It read the course of authorities89 as defending the 
proposition of principle (contrary to Pace) and held that Shym-
kowich was not inconsistent with them. Locke J.'s opinion was 
held to be tacitly approved by Estey and Fauteux JJ., although not 
found to be substantiated on the facts (though here the court 
spoke of the honesty rather than the reasonablenessof the mistake). 
The recent Court of Appeal decision in Laroche was held to be 
inconsistent with the Rand J. (and Taschereau J.) position," and 
the Ontario court felt that the Supreme Court reversal of Laroche 
was purely factual and thus tacitly approved the general legal prin-
ciple. 
Thus we see that four times the Supreme Court has been di-
rectly faced with this important issue of principle. Never once has 
it adequately analysed it or seen its roots in common law and 
statutory history. Never once has it assessed the competing social 
claims which underlie the basic issue. Except for the sparsely 
reasoned judgment of Rand J., never once has it stated clearly 
the rule it proposed to adoot to deal with the issue. It is impossible 
not to believe that this lack of clarity results from the lack of his-
torical, analytical, and evaluative treatment. Canadian law is left 
with the direct conflict between two provincial Courts of Appeal. 
C. The Varieties of Fault: Herein of Accident. 
The concept of mens rea, the subjective element in the com-
mission of crime, obviously must be understood in relation to the 
objective requirements for this offence. These objective elements, 
87 Citine Williams and Turner, op. cit., footnote 27. 
88 r19661 2 O.R. 63 (Ont. C.A.). 
89 Fsneciallv relyine on Bernhard, supra, footnote 72. 
90 The Nova Scotip Court of ADveal had aereed with this conclusion 
in Pace. but drew a different inference about the Supreme Court reversal 
of Laroche. 
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the events which must occur, can be divided into three categories 
-the conduct of the accused, the circumstances in which it takes 
place, and the consequences to which it gives rise. We have already 
talked about the nature of the mental element which relates to 
the first two of these categories, the conscious voluntary character 
of the conduct and the actual awareness or lack of mistake about 
the existing relevant circumstances. What we are now to deal with 
is the response of the Supreme Court to the third form of subjec-
tive excuse, that the consequences required for the offence were 
the accidental products of the defendant's conduct. 
A variety of mental attitudes towards the consequences might 
possibly negative the defence of accident in our criminal law. A 
person may want the consequences to come about and choose to 
act for this purpose, either as his ultimate goal, as an inter-
mediate means which is necessary to achieve it, or as an inevitable 
concomitant of the successful accomplishment of his ends. In the 
literature any one of these attitudes would be termed "intention", 
on the assumption that each is equally blameworthy. If the con-
sequence is not intended in any one of these senses, its occurrence 
is accidental. However, accidents may be produced as a result of 
the unreasonable and careless behaviour of the defendant, con-
duct creating an undue risk of this harm. If so, the accident can 
be said to result from his negligence. 
Two further distinctions are possible between different forms of 
accident. The person may or may not have thought about the 
substantial possibility of the risk occurring and have decided to 
run the risk in any event for his own ends. Hence the negligence, 
the production of the consequence, may be advertent or in-
advertent. The former kind of carelessness is conventionally called 
recklessness." Another and different line may be drawn across 
this subdivision though, based on the seriousness of the risk. 
The circumstances as perceivable by the actor may indicate a very 
great or lesser likelihood that more or less serious harm will 
materialize from his conduct. His failure to adopt appropriate pre-
cautions, whether advertent or inadvertent failure, can be des-
cribed then as gross or slight negligence. Gross negligence may 
also be called recklessness." Although these two distinctions are 
logically quite different, it should be obvious as a practical matter 
that the compelling character of the risk will be an important factor 
in the fact-finder's inference about whether the actor consciously 
perceived and then ignored it. 
A very substantial debate has developed in the literature about 
91 See, for example, Williams, The Mental Element in Crime (1965),
Ch. 1, and s. 2.02 of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, Pro-
posed Official Draft (1962). 
" See, for example, Brett, An Inquiry into Criminal Guilt (1963), Ch. 4. 
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when it is appropriate for the criminal law to punish defendants 
whose conduct has produced prohibited but unintended and ac-
cidental consequences. It is fair to say that all of the participants 
in this debate accept the legitimacy of extending the criminal 
sanction from the area of intended effects to those which are pro-
duced by advertent negligence-recklessness in this sense. The 
dispute is joined over the further question of whether it is ap-
propriate also to sanction criminal conduct which inadvertently 
produces harmful consequences, as a result of neglect in a seri-
ously risky situation-what we might call gross inadvertent negli-
gence, or recklessness in a second sense. 
As far as the policy debate is concerned, what is important 
is not the words that are used, but rather the underlying psycho-
logical states they are supposed to denote. It is easy to understand 
how the overlapping categories of negligence, recklessness, gross 
carelessness, and so on can lead to conceptual confusion. The 
gravaman of the real debate, though, is the question of whether 
criminal law should be used to stigmatize only conscious decisions 
to produce a risk with harmful results,93 or should also be resorted 
to as a means of deterring inattention which may be just as danger-
ous." I would suppose that even the adherents of the latter posi-
tion would want to single out only those who are capable of 
meeting the objective standards of care prescribed by the law and 
would find offensive any strict liability for the few who are 
abnormally incapable of doing better." Assuming that distinction, 
though, the question still remains as to how attenuated the concept 
of fault or mens rea should be made as it is extended into the 
area of inadvertent accidents. 
As can be seen from the foregoing, the distinctions and possi-
bilities are numerous and complex here. I have merely indicated 
the nature of the main dispute without canvassing the extensive 
arguments that are made on both sides. The question is similar in 
principle to one I spoke of earlier, whether an unreasonable mis-
take about existing circumstances is an acceptable alternative to 
both mens rea or strict liability. Unlike the latter, the problem 
of fault in accidents has come up consistently before the Supreme 
Court, in a family of related cases involving driving offences. 
The opinions in these cases indicate a total lack of appreciation of 
the distinctions and arguments I have talked about. Perhaps it is 
most charitable to assume that the court was confused by the con-
text in which the problem arose, the constitutional division of 
" See Hall, Negligent Behaviour Should Be Excluded From Penal 
Liability (1963), 63 Col. L. Rev. 632. 
* See Wechsler and Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 
(1937), 37 Col. L. Rev. 701. 
" See Hart. Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal Responsibility in op. 
cit., footnote 38, p. 136. 
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authority in respect of penalizing the conduct of negligent drivers. 
The first case, O'Grady v. Sparling9 6 involved the question of 
whether the Manitoba Highway Traffic Act validly made careless 
driving a provincial offence, in the face of the Code prohibition 
of criminal negligence in driving. The Supreme Court -in this case, 
and in R. v. Stephens" held that the provincial offence was con-
stitutionally valid. 
There were two issues in the case. First, did the provinces have 
the right to create such legislation at all, in the face of the con-
stitutional allocation of exclusive legislative competence in the field 
of "criminal law" to the federal Parliament? Here the majority 
judgment of Judson J." held the provinces did have this right, 
for purposes of regulating provincial highways. The dissenting 
judgment of Cartwright J." disagreed, saying that punishment of 
careless driving was the exercise of the criminal law power. The 
next question was whether the actual exercise of the federal crim-
inal law power to create the offence of criminal negligence on the 
road rendered the prima facie valid provincial legislation inopera-
tive or whether they could each live concurrently. The same 
division of opinion continued to uphold the present validity of the 
provincial statute. It is in this second context that our own prob-
lem came to the fore as the judges attempted to discern the mean-
ings and relative compatibility of these two provisions. 
In this regard, what is of interest is that both opinions, 
concurred in by all the nine judges on the court, agreed that 
criminal negligence meant advertent negligence. Both Judson and 
Cartwright JJ. refer to Williams and Turner's edition of Kenny... 
for the conceptual distinctions I referred to earlier. Criminal negli-
gence, defined by the Code as the wanton and reckless disregard 
of the lives and safety of other persons, is now stated to mean 
advertent attention to these consequences. Cartwright J. agrees 
with Judson J. that this equation of criminal negligence under the 
Code with recklessness as thus defined makes it quite different from 
the inadvertent negligence which is sufficient for careless driving. 
The latter argues though that a decision by Parliament to punish 
only advertent negligence on the highway carries with it the nega-
tive implication that inadvertent negligence should not be pun-
ished. His theories of constitutional concurrency did not carry 
the day. 
Of importance here is the almost inadvertent character of the 
" Supra, footnote 10. 
97 [1960] S.C.R. 823. The line-up in this case was exactly the same as 
in the earlier decision. 
" Kerwin C.J., Taschereau, Fauteux, Abbott, Martland and Ritchie JJ. 
agreed. 
9Locke J. concurring.10Op. cit., footnote 27. 
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policy decision which had been made about the basis of criminal 
liability for negligence. Because the court's attention is focused 
on the constitutionality of provincial legislation, it does not really 
see the policy implications for the criminal law of its interpreta-
tion of the "criminal negligence" section, one which applies to 
many other offences besides driving an automobile. In particular, 
it did not advert at all to the historical debate between common law 
judges and academics about the proper reach of criminal punish-
ment. I believe the court is right in deciding that "recklessness" 
requires advertent foresight of consequences but it is not a suf-
ficient reason for this conclusion that two English text writers 
have reached this conclusion about their own common law, and 
even then with some necessary qualification. What the court should 
have done was to relate this conclusion to the basic policies of 
blameworthiness in the criminal law which limit punishment to 
those who voluntarily choose to break the criminal law and risk 
the creation of prohibited harms. If the court had seized this 
opportunity to think about a general principle or presumption 
concerning the minimum kind of culpability which should normal-
ly be necessary for criminal guilt, it might have avoided the 
tortuous rationalizations in the rest of this sequence of decisions.'' 
At the time of O'Grady v. Sparling, the only existing federal 
legislation was that relating to criminal negligence. In 1961, 
though, there was enacted into the Code a prohibition of driving 
"in a manner that is dangerous to the public, having regard to 
all the circumstances"."' Of course, this would raise anew the 
issue of the continued viability of provincial careless driving legis-
lation which had only been held valid vis- -vis "criminal negli-
gence". The question reached the court in Mann V. The Queen,' 
where a High Court judge had held the careless driving section 
inoperative in the face of the "dangerous driving" provision, 
because both penalized the same conduct and each was satisfied 
with only inadvertence as to this conduct. The Supreme Court 
upheld the Ontario Court of Appeal, which had reversed Mr. 
Justice Haines, and sustained the continued operation of "care-
less driving". 
Cartwright J. wrote the most comprehensive decision, however 
defective it was. He indicated his respect for precedent by conced-
ing the questions of provincial power he had unsuccessfully ad-
vanced in O'Grady. The question that remained, though, was 
'o' It might also have prevented the difficult to justify decision in R. v. 
Rogers (1968), 4 C.C.C. 278. Apparently the Supreme Court refused leave 
to appeal from this case which limited its subjective interpretation of 
criminal negligence.
'S. 221(4). 
"" Supra, footnote 53. The same issue was also disposed of by the same 
court in R. v. McIver [1966] S.C.R. 256. 
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whether there were sufficient differences between federal and 
provincial provisions that the latter retain independent validity. 
Cartwright J. was able to answer in the affirmative because he felt 
that "dangerous driving" required advertent disregard of the con-
sequences, and not simply the inadvertent negligence of careless 
driving. 
How did he arrive at this conclusion? Of course, he did not 
address himself to the desirability of one interpretation rather 
than another in the light of the established objectives of the 
criminal law. Instead he referred to an earlier decision of the 
Quebec Court of Appeal,'" where Casey J. had interpreted an 
earlier version of the dangerous driving section as requiring a 
"moral element" not necessary for ordinary negligence, to wit 
"knowledge or wilful disregard of the consequences". According to 
Cartwright J., Parliament must have been aware of this inter-
pretation and intended to adopt it when they re-enacted the pro-
vision. He recognized that the earlier statute, which had been re-
pealed, had contained the word "recklessly" which was not in the 
new or otherwise identical section. However, he did not find 
significant the omission of this very word "reckless" whose defini-
tion by Williams and Kennyo' he had read into the "criminal 
negligence" section. Nor did he advert to the problem of why 
Parliament would want to enact a new statutory crime which was 
identical to one that had very recently been interpreted authorita-
tively by the Supreme Court itself. 
Fauteux J.'" just asserted that the "dangerous driving" and 
"careless driving" provisions differed in subject-matter, legislative 
purpose, and legal and practical effect, and thus both could op-
erate concurrently. Spence J., while agreeing with Cartwright J., 
seemed to find another kind of difference, in the kinds of conduct 
which satisfy both sections. Danger to other persons is not a 
necessary ingredient of careless driving, which may be satisfied by 
inconvenience to, or obstruction of, others. Ritchie J."o' Simply 
stated that the sections dealt with different subject matters, since 
"careless driving" would cast a wider net over conduct than would 
"dangerous driving". He said that Parliament by section 221 (4) 
has not created a crime of inadvertent negligence. He did not say 
that Parliament intended to create a crime of advertent negligence. 
Judson J. in the final analysis, ended up by concurring with all 
of these varied and contrasting positions, except that of Spence J. 
The effort up to now had been to save provincial legislation, 
perhaps a commendable objective in the Canada of the Sixties. 
1
0 R. v. Loiselle (1953), 17 C.R. 323 (Que. C.A.). 
1e Op. cit., footnote 27. 
'0 Abbott and Judson JJ. concurring. 
107 Martland and Judson JJ. concurring. 
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The fall-out created in the process, though, would require further 
effort to make sense of the operation of the three sections, especi-
ally "dangerous driving". When persons were charged under the 
latter section, it would no longer be sufficient to speculate about 
differences between it and the "careless driving" clause. Differences 
there had to be because of Mann, but some specific standard had 
to be articulated giving precise meaning to the term "dangerous 
driving". Perhaps the most intensive effort was that of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in R. v. Binus.'" There the court held that 
criminal negligence and dangerous driving were distinguished as 
advertence and inadvertence, while dangerous driving and care-
less driving, both involving inadvertence, were distinguished by the 
nature of the consequences themselves. Dangerous driving actually 
creates a danger to the lives or safety of the public (though not 
necessarily results in harm) while careless driving may be such 
without any risk of harm. Either one may be satisfied by inad-
vertent deviation from reasonable care, whether very considerable 
or slight. 
When the case reached the Supreme Court,"o' the conviction 
was unanimously confirmed, but not this reasoning. Two judges did 
agree with Mr. Justice Laskin's Appeal Court judgment, Judson 
J."' holding that the inadvertent failure to exercise reasonable 
care is sufficient if it is in fact dangerous to the public. Cart-
wright J."' in a two-page judgment, rejected the arguments in 
Laskin J.'s page opinion. He agreed that the Laskin and Judson 
JJ.'s position was most persuasive on the merits. However, he 
felt constrained to follow the binding precedent of Mann,"' where, 
or so he found, five of the seven judges had held advertent negli-
gence necessary for "dangerous driving". Such remarks were 
not obiter in that case and hence had to be followed, in the absence 
of compelling reasons not to do so. Because he felt the charge 
sufficient in any case, he upheld the conviction. 
Neither of Cartwright J.'s propositions appears to stand close 
analysis. As far as the merits are concerned, the Laskin-Judson 
JJ. proposal has very little to offer. It must be remembered that 
the federal government was enacting criminal legislation as part 
of the Criminal Code. Interpreting what it has done and im-
plementing its will requires that the court look at its product 
from this point of view, no matter what difficulties it may have 
created for itself in its constitutional efforts. In this regard, the 
first question is whether there should be a strong presumption in 
favour of advertence-of conscious decision to run the risk-as 
108 [1966] 4 C.C.C. 193 (Ont. C.A.).
" Supra, footnote 11. 
110 Taschereau C.J. agreeing. 
n1 Ritchie and Spence JJ. concurring. 
112 Supra, footnote 53. 
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a condition of criminal blame. In the light of the answer to this, 
the second question is whether Parliament has made a sufficiently 
clear statement of its will to the contrary. 
If we think that "dangerous driving", read in conjunction with 
"criminal negligence", must be interpreted as involving only 
"inadvertent negligence", then the Laskin-Judson JJ. version of 
the latter just does not make sense, within the perspective of the 
criminal law. After all, we are trying to influence conduct-human 
behaviour-and our definitions must then refer to the situation 
from the point of view of the actors at the time this conduct occurs. 
The question as to danger, then, must not be whether it in fact 
existed, but rather whether the actor did or should have realized 
it existed while he was driving, and thus should have taken steps 
to have avoided it. Of course, Haines J.'s earlier judgment in 
Mann is then correct, that (except perhaps for some rare and 
trivial instances), the same question is raised for careless driving. 
It is because the driver should perceive danger in a situation that 
his failure to adopt appropriate precautions is "careless". 
This does not mean that no rational distinction can be drawn 
between "dangerous" and "careless" driving. All that is necessary 
is that we drop the corollary to the Laskin-Judson JJ. opinion, 
that any deviation, whether slight or considerable, from the stan-
dard of reasonable care is sufficient for both offences. Obviously 
there are real differences in the kinds of harm which can be 
caused, the imminence of the risks being realized, and the in-
difference to the precautions which are available. We already make 
much the same kind of distinction in tort law between "gross" or 
excessive negligence and the "ordinary" variety. Surely this is a 
more rational distinction between "dangerous" and "careless" 
driving than the one that all judges in the case find "most per-
suasive". 
I do not contend that this is the meaning of the distinction 
which the federal legislature "intended" in passing section 221(4). 
The word "dangerous" is not self-defining and a perusal of the 
legislative history in Hansardshows they were not quite sure what 
they intended but, at least, that they did not think about this 
point. However, the court's constitutional decision in O'Grady 
and Mann set an authoritative framework in which the court had 
to work out a rational adjustment between the three offences. If 
one considers the point of the whole definitional exercise-the 
imposition of different grades of penalty, some of which carry the 
stigma of the Criminal Code-this kind of differentiation at least 
makes sense and is not incompatible with the evidence we have 
of the legislative will."' 
u' See Hoover, Dangerous Driving: A Controversial Decision (1966), 
9 Crim. L.Q. 37. 
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But of course Cartwright J.'s majority judgment did not accept 
the Laskin-Judson JJ. approach. Although it would have liked to 
do so, the constraints of stare decisis precluded this. Was the court 
really bound by this precedent in the way Cartwright J. suggested, 
because this is what five of the seven judges said? If we reread 
Mann, though, we find that only Cartwright J. explicitly said that 
advertent negligence was required for "dangerous driving". Spence 
J., who agrees with him here, suggested quite a different distinc-
tion in Mann, in fact one that was a precursor to the Laskin-
Judson JJ. approach. Ritchie J.'s judgment is totally ambiguous, 
although he now also agrees with Cartwright J. It is hard to find 
the two dissenters, since the last position, that of Fauteux J., was 
the opinion of three judges (Abbott and Judson JJ. also). Perhaps 
Cartwright J. wished to include Judson J. among the five who 
agreed with him, since Judson J. said he did. Yet Judson J. now 
says he does not and writes an opinion adopting what was, in 
effect, the Spence J. position in Mann, the only one he did not 
agree with in Mann. One might conclude by saying that this is a 
rather tortuous way to find a precedent which obligates a majority 
to reach a conclusion which it feels unpersuasive on the merits. 
Yet, perhaps this is all legalistic irrelevancy. The court has 
required, in a rather roundabout way, that criminal prosecution 
under the Code for improper driving requires proof of a conscious, 
fully voluntary effort. Good arguments can be made (although 
they were not made) that this is a thoroughly desirable restriction 
on the imposition of the stigma and condemnation inherent in 
criminal punishment. Perhaps, though, the inadequacy of the means 
utilized to reach a defensible result can return to haunt the court. 
Since my writing this article the court has decided the case of 
R. v. Peda," a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal convict-
ing the defendant of "dangerous driving" over the dissents of 
Laskin J.A., in the Court of Appeal and Cartwright J. in the Su-
preme Court. The essence of the dispute on appeal concerned 
the trial judgment's direction which simply read and then para-
phrased the statutory definition of the crime. Laskin J.A. and 
Cartwright J. held that some explicit reference to the "advertent" 
character of the offence was necessary. The majority in each court 
disagreed. 
As was stated earlier, Laskin J.A. had written the opinion in 
Binus which held that dangerous driving could be committed "in-
advertently". Naturally enough, he read the Supreme Court's 
Binus opinion and decided that his earlier view of the law was 
rendered invalid. Amazingly enough, every judge on the Supreme 
n [1969] S.C.R. 905. Since writing this, an extensive treatment of this 
whole sequence has appeared. See Bums, An Aspect of Criminal Negli-
gence (1970), 48 Can. Bar Rev. 47. 
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Court, including Cartwright J. did not agree that Binus had that 
effect. The court did not purport to over-rule Binus (although, 
parenthetically, some judges felt they had the power to do so), 
because none of the judges felt that Cartwright J.'s earlier state-
ments were a binding authority. Notwithstanding the majority 
status of his opinion, the fact that he eventually upheld the con-
viction made all statements in favour of the defendant obiter, 
because they were not necessary steps on the way to the actual 
decision. 
Such a theory of stare decisis, and the ratio decidendi of a 
case is ingenuous to say the least. When the highest appellate 
court is faced with a general legal question, one which has been 
raised in great depth both in argument and in the lower court 
decision, and then speaks very clearly to this legal question, it just 
does not make sense to say that its opinion is not an authoritative 
precedent. Surely it is irrelevant that, after making its decision 
on the legal question, the opinion goes on to hold that this rule 
does not apply for the benefit of the party which had contended 
for the rule itself. On this court's theory, the statements in Hedley 
Byrne,"' for instance, about duty of care with regard to negligent 
misrepresentation are merely obiter because the House of Lords 
later found the duty did not obtain in the concrete situation. 
The fallacy in the court's position lies in its failure to consider 
the reasons for stare decisis itself in determining what statements in 
an opinion are its authoritative and binding ratio. Surely the 
demands of predictability, objectivity and fairness in legal reason-
ing require that Cartwright J.'s remarks in Binus be given the same 
status no matter how he evaluated the particular facts of the case. 
Of course, I do not doubt that the court should be able to over-
rule its earlier decisions in certain cases, perhaps including this 
one. If it does, though, it should be aware of the significance 
of this step. 
What did the court decide about the proper definition of 
"dangerous driving"? Cartwright J.,"' while agreeing that Binus 
was not binding, stuck to his curious theory that "advertent negli-
gence" was required by O'Grady and Mann, because the court had 
held there that "inadvertent negligence" was not sufficient. The 
majority opinion of Judson J."' agreed that the section did not 
create a crime of "inadvertent negligence", (because of Mann). 
However, he thought that the section itself was crystal-clear in 
meaning; the jury instruction was perfectly adequate in simply 
repeating it. Presumably he means to incorporate by reference 
the interpretation suggested by Laskin J.A. in Binus and accepted 
11 [1964] A.C. 465. The famous House of Lords decision regarding 
negligent misrepresentation. 
116 Hall and Spence JJ. concurring. 
17 Fauteux, Abbott, Martland, and Ritchie JJ. concurring. 
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then by Judson J. Whatever else might be said about the merits 
of this theory, it is fair to say that the section does not immediate-
ly, lucidly, and explicitly express it to a jury without elaboration. 
The final opinion of Pigeon J. is even stranger, and the oddest 
fact is that Ritchie J. also joins in this opinion as well as that of 
Judson J. Pigeon J. construes Mann as having held that dangerous 
driving requires mens rea because it is a criminal offence and thus 
is different from a regulatory or statutory offence. Earlier he had 
agreed that mens rea consists of either intention or recklessness. 
Pigeon J. then says that "dangerous driving" cannot be committed 
by inadvertence, and thus agrees with the minority on this point. 
However, he holds that the jury instruction must refer to mens rea 
only if the evidence might support a relevant finding. Since he did 
not feel this was possible here, he upheld the conviction. 
The oddity of Ritchie J.'s behaviour, and the importance of 
it, thus becomes apparent. Four judges-Cartwright, Spence, Hall, 
and Pigeon JJ.-clearly think dangerous driving is a mens rea 
criminal offence. From this opinion, as well as in Binus, Judson 
J. does not agree, and the same appears true of Fauteux, Abbott 
and Martland JJ. Ritchie J. appears to agree with both Judson 
and Pigeon JJ., whereas in Binus he agreed with Cartwright J. 
How lower courts will react to this situation is purely speculative. 
If we retreat to behaviouralism, it does appear that they can hardly 
go wrong if they uphold all provincial statutes and convict all 
defendants. At least it appears that a consistent thread in the 
Supreme Court decisions has been their concern to put no road-
blocks in the way of control of driving behaviour. That this in-
volves the risks of real injustice to individual defendants who 
can be charged with two different offences for the same conduct, 
and thus are subjected to coercive plea bargaining and irrational 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, does not appear as yet to be 
of great concern to the Supreme Court. 
D. Presumed and Constructive Intent. 
Up to now, the facet of mens rea which involves intention of, 
or advertence to, the consequences has been considered in the 
context of cases where the consequences did not occur. The 
driving offences we have been talking about penalized conduct 
which (knowingly or unknowingly) created the risk of certain 
harms resulting. The cases with which this section is concerned 
dealt with situations where the harm did result-the consequence 
of death-and the question is whether the defendant should be 
held responsible for it. The assumption in each is that the statute 
does not permit strict liability and some form of mens rea is 
required. The issues raised concern the existence of presump-
tions or other special rules for imputing the required mens rea 
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to the defendant, such special doctrines being especially prevalent 
in the criminal law of murder. 
What makes this area of our concern so noteworthy is the 
presence of the greatly discussed and heavily criticized House of 
Lords decision in D.P.P. v. Smith."' This case held that, in the 
English law of capital murder, the defendant's guilt was satisfied 
by conduct on his part causing death where a reasonable man 
would foresee it causing grievous bodily harm. In effect, murder 
can be committed by a stupid person's inadvertent negligence."' 
Now, as was said earlier, we must make inferences about intent or 
advertence from conduct, as well as from credible statements of 
the actor on the stand. The question is whether such conduct 
should create a presumption, rebuttable or irrebutable, of the 
existence of the necessary mental state? Should the trier of fact 
be forced to decide simply on the basis of the objective character 
of the conduct or should he be allowed to believe or disbelieve 
verbal protestations about the accused's intent? 
The question arises in two separate contexts in Canadian law. 
The first is the review of jury charges concerning factual infer-
ences of intent and how far it is proper to speak of presumptions 
here. The second is the interpretation and elaboration of the 
Canadian law of constructive murder, committed in the course 
of certain named offences. Conceptually the two are distinguish-
able. The first speaks in terms of presuming or imputing an 
actual intent while the second imputes legal responsibility for the 
consequences without regard to whether there was any mens rea 
at all. However, if the doctrines of presumption are extended as 
far as they are in Smith, then, as a practical matter there is no 
real.difference in their operation. 
The effect of the Supreme Court's conception of its role-its 
default on the job of being a supreme appellate court of Canadian 
criminal law-is amply illustrated here. An early case, Wu v. The 
King"' did use the language of presumption of intention of the 
natural consequences of one's acts. The main modern case, Brad-
ley,"' directly and explicitly poses the issue, but the court never 
"s Supra, footnote 44. 
". The House of Lords did impose some curiously illogical, though 
pragmatically understandable, limitations on the reach of this presumption. 
Actual knowledge of the existing situation is necessary as well as some 
kind of unlawful act directed at the victim, conditions which seemed de-
signed to protect the negligent driver from the risk of a murder conviction. 
`o [19341 S.C.R. 609. 
121 [19561 S.C.R. 723. 
The court's performance in this case is typical of its customary work. 
Bradley involved a death arising out of a drunken fist fight in an alley on a 
very cold night. The accused apparently knocked the deceased down, kicked 
him in the head, gagged him with his own belt, took away his coat, and 
left him alive but unconscious. Death arose from all of the injuries and ex-
posure after drinking. There was evidence of a skull fracture but none that 
the accused was aware of this. The trial judge spoke of the presumption of 
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seems to consider it a significant legal problem, and does not 
mention Wu, or, indeed, any relevant precedent. Finally, as was 
stated earlier, Ritchie J. in King, in an obiter discussion of the 
effect of impairment from the voluntary consumption of alcohol, 
did speak of the objective character of mens rea with reference 
to mistake. Not only did he not mention Smith,"' the very recent 
English cause cdl~bre, but he did not perceive the relevance of 
Bradley or O'Grady, which went in the opposite direction in 
defining mens rea with reference to accident."' 
The second doctrine in this area, normally called "constructive 
murder", involves the interpretation of the Code's provisions 
which incorporate and define the common law of murder during 
the commission of offences. Using a wide variety of mental states, 
the Code enunciates different kinds of conduct which will lead 
to a conviction of capital murder if death results from the ac-
cused's committing one of a series of indicated offences. The 
typical case in which death results involves the commission of 
robbery, and this gave rise to four Supreme Court cases in this 
area. 
the natural consequences of one's acts and the accused was convicted. This 
was affirmed by the Court of Appeal and by the Supreme Court of Canada, 
the latter by a majority of four to three. 
All of the judgments treated the case as involving only narrow factual 
issues of the proper interpretation of the evidence and the compatibility 
of the jury charge with the evidence. The tacit assumption of all appears 
to be that speaking of a presumption of intent is incorrect if it purports to 
be any more than an aid in discovering the actual intent of the accused. 
(This is the interpretation of this case by Beck and Parker, The Intoxicated 
Offender-A Problem of Responsibility (1966), 44 Can. Bar Rev. 563, at 
p. 605 et seq., and Ryan, The Objective Test of Criminal Liability (1960-
61), 3 Crim. L.Q. 305, at p. 320 et seq.). No reasons are given in favour 
of this conclusion, no cases are cited in support of it, and no clear state-
ment is made about it. All the discussion is directed to the question of 
whether, notwithstanding the erroneous charge, any substantial wrong or 
miscarriage of justice occurred. 
As regards this focus of the case, what is important for our purposes 
is that the lineup of judges on this narrow issue of judgment aptly reflects 
our general attitudinal conclusions. Fauteux J. writes one majority opinion, 
Locke J. another and narrower one for the same conclusion. Cartwright, 
Rand and Nolan JJ. each wrote opinions, all making the same points, that 
knowledge of the skull fracture was critical and had to be brought home 
to the accused. The jury's function of deciding this was usurped by the 
trial judge and by the court majority here. 
.. Supra, footnote 44. 
123 The real maker of Canadian law in this area has been the Ontario 
Court of Appeal. In R. v. Gianotti (1956), 23 C.R. 259, it held that there 
was no presumption of law that a person intends the natural consequences 
of his lethal acts. This case, which deals with the authorities and issues, was 
followed in later cases, in Ontario (R. v.. Ortt, [1969] 1 O.R. 461) and 
British Columbia (R. v. Carter (1966), 56 W.W.R. 65). In fact, in the 
final case (Ortt), the court went farther to disapprove of all language of 
presumotion here, even factual, because of the suggestion of an onus on the 
accused. With eminent good sense, it told trial judges to speak to judges
in terms of "reasonable inferences" about intention from "natural conse-
quences of acts". It is to be hoped that this attitude will also be reflected 
in the Supreme Court. 
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Although none of the cases advert to this kind of argument 
it is pertinent to inquire what purpose might motivate legislative 
creation of constructive murder. After all, if a person is committing 
an offence (or attempting to do so), he will be subject to some 
punishment. The imposition of a further capital penalty for ac-
cidental death which results may reflect legislative condemnation 
of particularly wicked conduct or the desire for vengeance on be-
half of the deceased. More charitably, it evidences great concern 
for deterrence of peculiarly dangerous methods of committing 
offences, especially the use of guns or stopping the victim's 
breath. " 
The first case, decided by the pre-1949 court, King v. 
Hughes' reversed unanimously a conviction of capital murder 
where a gun was discharged accidentally in a struggle with the 
storeowner during a robbery. The lack of a voluntary act in 
discharging the pistol precluded a murder conviction following 
inevitably. As a result of this case, the federal Parliament enacted 
(the present) section 202(d) which the court in Rowe v. The 
King"' interpreted as involving strict liability for death occurring 
because of the use of a gun in a robbery. 
Of interest in the second case is the apparent reversal of at-
titude to the extension of constructive murder. Only Cartwright J., 
in dissent, holds that the general principle of mens rea in murder 
should be considered over-ruled by Parliament, only when and so 
far as appears clearly necessary from its language. All the others, 
in judgments written by Kerwin"7 and Kellock JJ., hold that 
"flight" includes a situation over one hundred miles from the 
robbery while no pursuit at all was in progress. Rinfret, Kerwin 
and Taschereau JJ. had concurred in the narrower interpretation 
of the section in Hughes. I do not deny that their view of "flight" 
as involving simply the subjective appreciation of the accused is a 
viable reading of the language. It is obvious, though, that this is 
not inevitable and nowhere do they attempt to meet Cartwright 
J.'s mention of principle with anything more than dictionaries, 
certainly not with any practical arguments. 
The final two cases in this sequence, Cathro v. The Queen"' 
and Chow Bew v. The Queen"' again come down to a difference 
about the evidence and the significance of the trial judge's charge 
to the jury. All of the judges appeared to agree about the general 
" See discussion in Edwards, Constructive Murder in Canadian and 
English Law (1960-61), 3 Crim. L.Q. 481, at p. 506. 
"- [1942] S.C.R. 517. 
126 [1951] S.C.R. 713. There is a very good comment on this case and 
its background by Willes, Comment (1951), 29 Can. Bar Rev. 784. 
127 Rinfret C.J., Taschereau, Estey, and Fauteux JJ. concurring. 
8 [1956] S.C.R. 101. 
12o [1956] S.C.R. 124. See discussion of these cases in Ryan, op. cit., 
footnote 1, at pp. 82-84. 
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issues of law, the relationship of the constructive murder sections 
to the provisions defining parties to such an offence. The question 
which divided the court was again the narrow question of how 
this general set of doctrines should be applied to the facts of one 
case.130 
E. CapitalMurder-"Plannedand Deliberate". 
The problems presented by these cases are exactly the op-
posite of those raised in the earlier section. Instead of dealing with 
doctrines which weaken the protection afforded by the normal 
requirements of mens rea, the court here was forced to deal with 
statutory language intended to add a further degree of blame-
worthiness to the elements of the offence. Section 202A was en-
acted in 1961 to formulate a distinction between capital and non-
capital murder, the point of the distinction being to indicate which 
homicides were or were not to be subject to capital punishment-
"o Both defendants participated in the same robbery in which the store 
owner was killed. However, each was tried separately and the relevant evi-
dence which became part of the record was different. Each was convicted 
at trial, the convictions were both upheld by the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal, but the Supreme Court reversed Cathro's conviction while up-
holding Chow Bew's verdict. Cartwright J. was in favour of reversal in both 
cases, Fauteux, Taschereau and Locke JJ., approved the conviction. The 
swing votes were Rand and Kerwin JJ., while Estey J. who joined in the 
majority in Cathro, was ill by the time Chow Bew was decided. 
The pattern of law which emerged from the cases is a relatively clear 
resolution of some difficult problems of integrating different sections. 
Section 202 (then s. 260) dealt with the responsibility of either of the 
accused on the assumption that either committed the killing himself. Death 
was as a result of strangulation and liability would then be based on negli-
gence about grievous bodily harm. The defence of both, though, was that 
the other caused the death and thus each could be guilty of constructive 
murder only if section 21 (then s. 69) came into play so as to impute 
responsibility to him for the consequences of this conduct. The dissenting 
opinion in Cathro, by Fauteux and Taschereau JJ. was willing to find him, 
on his own evidence, a party under section 21 because of his actual par-
ticipation in the conduct which caused death. The majority held that this 
was factually ambiguous and the jury should have been more adequately 
instructed about liability merely from participation in a robbery. 
In Chow Bew there was no evidence at all about what went on during 
the same robbery, although evidence harmful to the accused had already 
been considered in Cathro. Rand and Kerwin JJ. apparently changed their 
minds about the necessity of instructions detailing the different results 
which would flow from different ways in which the robbery might have 
occurred. They were unwilling to give Chow Bew the right to have a jury 
decide whether Cathro committed the murder in the way Cathro had at-
tributed to Chow Bew in his own trial. Cartwright J. said that, notwith-
standing the lack of evidence, this question should be put to the jury. How 
much this kind of disagreement about the judge's role reflects differences in 
attitudes about mens rea and constructive murder is moot. The division 
does occur along the behavioural indications of attitude, though, including, 
especially, the voting pattern in Rowe. Moreover, it is obvious that greater 
concern for the jury's role, and relative non-use of the "substantial wrong 
or miscarriage of justice" test for asses~ing charges to the jury, would be 
favourable to the accu,ed on appeal even though the desirability and im-
portance at trial of precisely correct trial charges may be very debatable. 
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hanging. Assuming that culpable homicide is murder, whether in-
tended under section 201, or constructively under section 202, it 
becomes capital if the jury also finds that it was "planned and 
deliberate" (or falls into two other categories irrelevant for our 
purposes). Of course, this legislative language, although indicating 
to some extent Parliament's will, is not automatically self-defining 
for all purposes. In its short-lived span of six years (capital 
murder was further narrowed in 1967 by dropping these kinds of 
homicide), the Supreme Court was faced with several problems 
to which the language spoke only obliquely. 
The first, and most interesting, of these cases was More v. 
The Queen,"' where the court reversed a Manitoba Court of 
Appeal judgment that had upheld the conviction of the accused 
for capital murder. The accused had murdered his wife and un-
successfully attempted to commit suicide, all because he thought 
she would be unhappy when she learned of his financial difficulties. 
There was substantial evidence of planning of the murder, of steps 
taken over a period of several days leading up to its commission, 
and then further steps taken after it and before the suicide attempt. 
The defendant claimed, though, that the trial judge had inade-
quately instructed the jury about evidence of psychiatrists that he 
was suffering from a depressive psychosis resulting in an impair-
ment of his ability to reach decisions. He disclaimed any defence 
of insanity and asked that this evidence be related only to the 
question of capital murder. 
Cartwright J., in a short two-page judgmentl3' said that "de-
liberate" adds something to the requirement of "intention: and 
that this medical evidence is relevant to the question. Though 
this testimony would not satisfy the 'insanity' requirements of 
section 16, the latter is relevant only to the question of intention 
and murder, not deliberateness and capital murder". He added that 
he wished these remarks confined to the specific facts of this case. 
Judson J., whose opinion only discussed the evidence, agreed with 
Cartwright J. about the law. 
Fauteux J.'s opinion" seems almost directed to another case, 
because he finds a debatable and intellectually challenging prob-
lem, one worthy of more than just a conclusion. In trying to give 
meaning to the word "deliberate" he looked at both English and 
French dictionaries and reached the conclusion that some refer-
ence to a time element was intended. He concludes that Parliament 
wished to exclude all impulsive murders from the capital category. 
However, a murder may be planned, and not impulsive, notwith-
standing the fact that it is irrationally motivated as the result of 
"' Supra, footnote 9. 
a Abbott, Judson, Ritchie, and Hall JJ. concurring. 
" Taschereau CJ. agreeing. 
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the accused's irresponsibility and mental impairment. To make the 
latter factors relevant, in this mitigated way, is to introduce a form 
of diminished responsibility, analogous to the recent English 
experiment. However, the Canadian Parliament, which must have 
been aware of the latter, did not choose to do this explicitly. It 
should not be presumed that Parliament would change funda-
mental rules of criminal responsibility and insanity unless this is 
clearly expressed, and he cites an American text... to show that 
this result is inconsistent with general principles. 
It seems clearly true to me that Fauteux J. is right about the 
significance of the innovation the majority are making in this case. 
Surely if a person was perfectly sane, and planned to kill someone 
and make elaborate preparations and took steps over an extended 
period of time, he could not claim exemption here because he 
finally committed himself only at the last minute. Yet this appears 
to be the kind of use to which the majority wishes this evidence 
put, as Cartwright J.'s cautionary remarks indicate. This is un-
fortunate, because Fauteux J.'s position, however more sophisti-
cated than the others, is not free from difficulties. 
As is typical of his opinions, Fauteux J.'s very intelligent 
arguments are within a very narrow compass, flowing from its 
origin in a dictionary. He does not advert to the whole point of the 
legislative exercise, to single out a category of offenders for whom 
this harshest of penalties is to be reserved. When we look at the 
question from this perspective, what is wrong with the conclusion 
that a person whose responsibility is impaired should not be in-
cluded in this category? The phrase "planned and deliberate" 
indicates the legislative judgment that rational and cold-blooded 
murders, which usually are for gain, require this extra deterrence. 
It is true that it thus excludes the less rational, impulsive, situa-
tional kind of homicide but should not this same objective require 
exclusion of those who murder as a result of impairment of their 
reasoning faculties? The language Parliament used does not seem 
to preclude it."* 
1 Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defence (1954). He did 
not advert, though, to the analogous California developments in People V. 
Wells (1949), 20 P.2d 53 and People v. Gorshen (1959), 336 P.2d 492. 
'3 A year later, a somewhat similar case arose in McMartin v. The 
Queen, [1964] S.C.R. 484, where the evidence was supposed to show that 
the accused might act impulsively, unpredictably, dangerously, and with-
out provocation. All of the judges agree with Ritchie J., including Fauteux 
J., and Taschereau J., that the evidence is admissible for the capital murder 
issue, simply citing a passage from Cartwright J. in More as an authority. 
When a question appears clearly decided, an earlier dissenter will accept 
the precedent rather than adhere to his former position. Of greater interest, 
though, are Cartwright J.'s own doubts about the nature and strength of the 
More precedent, doubts which he expressed in The Queen v. Mitchell, 
[1964] S.C.R. 471. 
Here the accused had won an appeal in the British Columbia Court of 
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F. Drunkenness and Criminal Guilt. 
The case of R. v. George'" is the leading Canadian authority 
in the very complex and difficult area of intoxication and the 
criminal offender. It illustrates quite clearly the typical, even ex-
clusive mode of reasoning adopted in our Supreme Court. Con-
sideration of its impact and subsequent reatment in our lower 
courts of appeal amply demonstrates the deficiencies of such a 
process of decision-making, either in establishing authoritative legal 
rules for the country or in imparting any trace of rational quality 
and principle into the rules that flow from the institution. 
George was accused of robbery and acquitted at trial because 
the judge concluded that the evidence of his intoxicated state 
created a reasonable doubt of his intention to steal money from 
the victim of his violent blows. The Crown appealed on the basis 
that common assault was an included offence and the trial judge 
should have convicted George for this offence. At the Supreme 
Court level this contention was upheld by a majority of four to 
one. The dissenter, Locke J., did not address himself to the ques-
tion of drunkenness and mens rea, since he felt the Crown should 
not be able to raise the issue of included offences for the first time 
at the appeal level. 
The majority judgments of Fauteux'm and Ritchie JJ." both 
start with the assumption that the House of Lords decision in 
Beard"' is the locus classicus of our law. I do not deny that such 
a conclusion is legally defensible but I would assert that it is not 
inevitable. There is no statutory mention of drunkenness as a 
defence under the Criminal Code and thus no statutory require-
ment of Beard. Section 7(2) of the Code speaks of the preserva-
tion of the common law defences but our Code was enacted long 
Appeal on the grounds that the trial judge had not sufficiently directed the 
jury on the independent significance of evidence of drunkenness and provo-
cation to the question of capital murder. The majority judgment of Spence 
J. (Taschereau C.J., Fauteux, Martland, and Ritchie JJ. concurring), extends 
the logic of the More opinion to its widest reach, again its only reasons 
being the short quotation from Cartwright J.'s opinion in More. While Fau-
teux J. continues to concur in the extension of the position he earlier dis-
approved of, Cartwright J., who originally proposed it, now has his doubts. 
He said there were special facts in More, not present here, which likely 
differentiated the two. However, he would not make a final decision about 
this point because he was able also to uphold the appeal on a third evi-
dentiary ground. Yet this is a rather strange attitude to take, since the 
majority was deciding the general legal question even if he was not, and 
their conclusions would prove binding in later cases even if he disagreed. 
Cartwright J.'s decision to withhold the arguments he might make, though, 
is something which is symptomatic of his conception of his role as ad-
judicator of specific disputes, rather than appellate court developer of 
Canadian law. 
"I Supra, footnote 13. 
.' Taschereau J. concurring. 
" Martland J. concurring. 
19 [1920] A.C. 479. 
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before Beard, and the drunkenness defence had undergone several 
historical mutations up to then.' 
There is no reason to suppose the process had to stop at 
Beard for Canadian purposes, and there exists some decisional 
authority for regarding a specific Canadian law as legitimate."' The 
growth of the common law, both in Canada and England, in re-
spect of the defence of automatism shows the capacity for judicial 
development of the basic principles of the criminal law of excuses. 
There was a good "legal" reason for treating this question 
as closed in Canada, though, but this reason was not mentioned in 
the George opinion. The Supreme Court of Canada had already, 
in McAskill v. The King,"' decided that the Beard rules were the 
Canadian law of drunkenness as a criminal defence. As is usual, 
though, in George, the court treated its own precedents as irrele-
vant, while viewing the English case as something akin to Holy 
Writ. If the latter is a little exaggerated, the analogy to a statutory 
enactment is not. A passage from Beard is extracted, out of con-
text, and treated as an exhaustive statement of the common law 
defence, to be interpreted in accordance with the specific language 
used. The court does not see its task as the analysis of this langu-
age within the context in which it was used, as a step in the 
elaboration of a common law principle to be used in the solution 
of a social problem, only one instance of which occurred in 
Beard. 
The significant issue raised by the language in Beard was the 
distinction between general and specific intent. Does this distinc-
tion have any real content? If it does, should it be part of our 
law?.'. The issue was clearly posed in the questions of law pre-
sented to the court, since the first asked whether evidence of 
drunkenness "was relevant not only to the specific or special 
intent" but also to "the ordinary mens rea which is a constituent 
of all crimes". The response of the court was, to say the least, 
ambiguous. 
Both Fauteux and Ritchie JJ. cited Beard and made a distinc-
tion between intention in the sense of awareness or knowledge 
of what was done and intention in the sense of the ulterior purpose 
or objective for which conduct is undertaken. This could be said 
to define the distinction between general and specific intent and 
only the latter could be rebutted by evidence of intoxication. Yet, 
after holding that only the second intent was excluded by the 
judge's acquittal for robbery, both judges seemed to treat the 
relevance of intoxication to the first kind of intent as a problematic 
Especially as regards the validity of the Beard statements about 
proof. 
... As we shall see for both insanity and provocation. 
`[1931] S.C.R. 330. 
"' The best discussion is Beck and Parker, op. cit., footnote 121. 
1 
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issue of fact. Though Fauteux J. suggested it might be meta-
physically impossible to be so drunk as not to know one is as-
saulting (applying force to) another, both held, as a matter of 
fact, that there was such knowledge here despite the intoxication. 
The conviction for assault followed only after this latter con-
clusion. 
The ambiguity showed up in two subsequent lower court cases, 
Vandervoort'" and Boucher."' The first difficulty stemmed from 
the inadequacy of the analytical distinctions made in George. The 
opinions in the latter contrasted awareness of our action or con-
duct (making it voluntary) and desire of or advertence to the 
consequences which are the objective of our conduct (making it 
intentional). As we have seen, though, there is the further issue 
of the awareness of the circumstances which make conduct (or its 
consequences) criminal, which may fail by reason of ignorance 
or mistake. For instance, in the Rees situation, a person may have 
intercourse with a girl who is in fact under the age of sixteen 
and want to introduce evidence of his intoxication to support his 
claim that he was unaware of this factual circumstance. Each of 
these two provincial appellate cases raised the question of whether 
drunkenness could be used to negate awareness of a girl's refusal 
to consent to intercourse when the offender is charged with rape. 
Boucher held that rape does not require a specific intent and 
thus drunkenness is no defence. Vandervoort disagreed. Both 
relied on Beard as interpreted by George. 
However, this analytical inadequacy is not the major defect 
of the court's effort in George, since they might well respond that 
the distinction they made was sufficient for their own purposes. 
What is objectionable and inexcusable is their total failure to 
examine the reasons which justify the rule that is being adopted 
on the face of the opinion. Though the court should not be re-
quired to formulate, once and for all, a complete pattern of doc-
trine for all the cases which might arise in this area, it should 
indicate what it believes to be the underlying sense of the basic 
assumptions it is adopting, so as to give some direction and guid-
ance to the lower courts who will have to elaborate its efforts, 
at least at first instance. Instead the court treats this as an area 
where all the decisions have already been made in Beard, a con-
clusion it does not substantiate, and assumes that its task is 
merely to follow these judgments which are already part of our 
law. 
How should a more adequate opinion have been written? 
'- (1961), 130 C.C.C. 158 (Ont. C.A.). 
14s (1962), 39 C.R. 242 (B.C.C.A.). Boucher has been followed by this 
same court in R. v. Resener (1968), 4 C.C.C. 129 (B.C.C.A.) and by the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in R. v. Hartridge (1966), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 
332. 
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The first question to be considered by the Supreme Court is 
whether drunkenness, as such, should be a defence to criminal 
conduct, either totally (as duress or insanity) or partially (as pro-
vocation). We know that the usual effect of the consumption 
of alcohol is the breaking down of inhibitions and the lessening of 
our control over our emotions and impulses. The result may well 
be that we do things in our drunken condition which we would 
not do if we were sober. The problem for the law is whether we 
should punish the offender later, when he is sober, especially when 
it is the first and probably last time when it will occur. Should 
we excuse completely, or partially, or even require that the judges 
take drunkenness into account as a mitigating factor in the 
sentence? 
Beard concluded that such a result was inconsistent with the 
common law and should not be part of our legal system, and this 
was concurred in by our court in MacAskill. Such a judgment is 
rationally defensible, especially in the light of the intellectualistic 
assumption of other criminal defences such as insanity which pre-
sume the deterrent effect of awareness of the criminal sanction 
even in such a condition. However, Beard holds that drunkenness, 
just as insanity, is an excuse when it is so advanced that it 
excludes the possibility of knowledge, and thus of voluntary choice, 
in the circumstances. When our court in George recognized that 
drunkenness may be a defence by excluding intent, it should have 
appealed to the reasons for requiring mens rea and shown how 
drunkenness affected them. Of course, since we have seen that the 
court does not give any reason for the requirement of mens rea 
when it explicitly sets out to require it (in Beaver and O'Grady, 
and their respective progeny), we can understand, if not excuse, 
the omission in George. 
If we try to repair this omission, the question arises why the 
Boucher theory of the George defence is a rational one, a ques-
tion I suggest is a relevant prerequisite to making the theory part 
of our law. Do Boucher and Resener assume that ignorance 
or mistake about the existence of consent is no defence to rape 
even for the sober accused? Surely they would not when the very 
existence or absence of consent is the critical factor in making 
the conduct illicit.'" If this is a defence for a sober person,' 
should it not also be a defence for one who is equally ignorant, 
but due to his 'intoxication? Otherwise we clearly punish a per-
son for a crime he at no time chose to commit, simply because 
of his drunkenness. There are some cases where we admit the 
impropriety of this course, those cases where there is a "specific 
'" This would be totally inconsistent with the theory of Cartwright J. in 
Rees. 
"'See R. v. Okoye, [1964] Crim. L. Rev. 416. 
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intent" (whatever this means outside of its historically anachron-
istic, procedural context). But all of the reasons which justify it 
there require it also for "general intent" crimes."' 
Hence the basic objection to Boucher is that it does not make 
sense to acquit the person whose drunkenness prevents his choos-
ing to commit theft, while convicting another whose drunkenness 
prevented his choosing to commit assault or rape. Of course, all 
of this assumes that we believe the accused's story on the facts 
but it does not appear any more credible that the intent for theft 
can be "metaphysically" excluded by drink while the intent for rape 
or assault cannot be. Putting the question to the jury probably 
allows the latter to apply a standard of "substantial impairment", 
analogous to that used in insanity cases, which speak of "apprecia-
tion" and thus obtain much of what is sensible and desirable in 
a defence of drunkenness per se. 
Of course, none of this kind of analysis is manifested in any 
of the opinions in this area. All of them follow the stylistic lead 
of the court, though in a much more sophisticated way. What is 
apparent, though, is that a failure to consider the wider implica-
tions of what one is doing-one's purposes and policies-may be 
directly responsible for inadequate performance of a court's legal, 
direction-giving functions. 
G. Provocation and Duress. 
These two defences share certain important characteristics. 
Unlike almost all of the other examples we have discussed, they 
do not affect mens rea because of lack of knowledge or foresight 
of some kind and, instead, focus directly on our powers of choice. 
Duress, when it legally obtains, is held to vitiate completely any 
meaningful ability to choose to obey the criminal law while pro-
vocation affects this same power sufficiently to reduce the degree 
of offence for which one can be convicted. Second, each of these 
defences is given a somewhat detailed definition in the Code which 
thus may be taken to have frozen the process of common law de-
velopment in fixed language whose limits the courts must respect. 
Because our Code was originally drafted at a time when legal 
appreciation of the significance of this kind of defence was sub-
stantially under-developed, the court's attitude towards its own 
role becomes very important. 
Not only was provocation defined by a statutory provision, but 
the area was further structured by several Supreme Court pre-
cedents prior to this period as well as English decisions interpret-
4 It appears that Lord Birkenhead agreed with this reasoning in later 
statements in his Beard opinion. If this is so, the logic of the argument 
requires that drunkenness can also be used to negative the existence of the 
mental element of "recklessness", for instance, in criminal negligence or 
manslaughter cases; see R. v. Stones (1959) S.R. (N.S.W.) 25. 
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ing the related common law rules. The critical problem which is 
raised by the statutory section, considered by most of these de-
cisions, and at the heart of academic criticism of its present scope, 
is the threshold requirement that legal provocation must be such 
as would deprive the "ordinary" or "reasonable" man of self-
control. English cases defining the ambit of the defence have 
elaborated on this requirement and deemed irrelevant the accused's 
mental deficiency,'' unusual pugnacity,' intoxicated state,"' or 
a deformity such as sexual impotence."' For reasons to be men-
tioned later on, most commentators suggest that this tendency 
misses the whole point of the defence. 
Taylor"' was the chief decision in the area because it indicated 
the distinctive character of the Canadian law, in the light of our 
statute and the earlier Supreme Court cases. Kerwin J. traced the 
common law antecedents and the legislative history of the section 
(founded in Stephens' Draft Code) to show the innovative char-
acter of section 203, and especially the ability of a purely verbal 
insult to amount to legal provocation. A second question was 
raised about the relevance of drunkenness to either of the two 
facets of the defence. Unfortunately, all the judges assumed it was 
obvious that the "ordinary man" does not drink to the extent 
that his self-control in the face of insults might be impaired. That 
this is not obvious is amply indicated by the existence of some 
authority for the proposition that drunkenness which causes an 
49' R. v. Lesbini, [1914] 3 K.B. 116. 
'OR. v. Mancini, [1942] A.C. 1. 
15'R. v. McCarthy, [1954] 2 All E.R. 262. 
"'R. v. Bedder, [1954] 2 All E.R. 801. 
"' [1947] S.C.R. Two early Supreme Court decisions set the stage for 
its modern sequence. In Sampson, [1935] S.C.R. 634, the court, without 
reasons, upheld a Nova Scotia decision which had advocated a totally ob-
jective approach to the defence. As a result, a forty-five-year-old coloured 
man, with a mental age of twelve years, was convicted of murder for 
killing two boys who threw stones at him and insulted him racially. How-
ever, Manchuk, [1938] S.C.R. 18, might have affected this logic for two 
reasons. First, Duff J. explicitly adverted to the point of the provocation 
defence. The latter neither justified nor excused a homicidal act but it did 
render it less blameworthy because of the violent passions which prompted 
the conduct. Because the offender was not considered in complete control, 
he is to receive less than the automatic and extreme penalty for murder. 
The fact that he was still to be convicted and punished for manslaughter,
though, should have led later courts to reconsider the application of too 
ideal a standard of self-control in determining the beneficiaries of what is 
only a mitigation of criminal sanction. The decision in Manchuk could 
have been a fruitful precedent on its facts for a sensible interpretation of 
the "ordinary man" threshhold. It appears that provocation by one person 
would not be relevant to the killing of another: see R. v. Simpson (1915) 
841 L.J.K.B. 1893 (C.C.A.); it is not obvious from the section or from 
the policy which underlies it, why this must be so. However, a mistaken 
belief in the latter's implication in the provocation would be sufficient. Nor 
need this mistake be reasonable as long as it occurred in fact. Apparently 
the "ordinary man" could make unreasonable mistakes about a situation 
which provoked him to killing. 
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unreasonable mistake is relevant to provocation."' 
Taylor is important, though, for its holding that all subjec-
tive elements are relevant to the second question, whether the 
provocation in fact caused loss of control. Kellock"' and Estey JJ. 
show how the Beard limitation on the use of drunkenness does 
not apply to this specific issue since that case dealt with the effect 
on intention. Although provocation may affect fault or blame-
worthiness, in a wider sense, it does not exclude intention. Rather, 
it assumes intention and prima facie guilt and thenshows how this 
was created in a situation of passion induced by the wrongful 
act of the accused."' It operates to mitigate guilt in a limited way, 
in a specific context, by reducing murder to manslaughter. Curi-
ously, Kerwin J."' whose opinion is so adequate on the first prob-
lem of the nature of "wrongful act or insult", is unresponsive 
to the Estey analysis about drunkenness. 
The three cases in the present period did raise some sigi-
ficant legal questions for decision, but the court does not effec-
tively use them as the occasion for building up a more compre-
hensive theory of provocation and mens rea. Tripodi,"' essentially, 
is a very narrow case dealing with the application of the general 
requirement of "suddenness" which, obviously, must be at the 
heart of a passion-provoked crime. Although it is relatively analog-
ous in its facts to Taylor (reiteration by a wife of adultery already 
known to the defendant), Kellock"' and Taschereau JJ.'6 0 now 
decided against the accused to help form the majority."' Estey and 
Kerwin JJ. are now in the minority.'" Although the case is es-
sentially a decision about the facts, both majority and dissent set 
the case in the context of the statute and do refer to the precedents 
in its history, especially Taylor. It is perhaps the best example of 
Rand J.'s distinctive style-very abstract, rather sparsely reasoned, 
little analysis of the cases, but a clear statement of the rule 
adopted, and a very pithy argument at the end."' His effort here 
is much better than in Shymkowich, as is the dissent of Estey J. 
" See R. v. Letenock (1917), 22 Cr. App. Rep. 221 (C.C.A.). 
" Taschereau J. concurring. 
15 The decision is an intimation of what might happen in the capital 
murder area, with the use of drunkenness to negate "planning and delibera-
tion", although Taylor is much better reasoned than Mitchell. 
" Rinfret C.J. concurring. 
[1955] 4 D.L.R. 445. 
" Locke J. concurring. 
16o Who agrees with Rand J.'s opinion. 
161 Fauteux J. also joined with Rand J. 
161 Cartwright and Abbott JJ. now join in the dissent of Estey J. 
"1 "It may be that such a code is recognized in Bagaladi as a mitigation 
of the law's severest sanction, but it has no place in the law of this country. 
Any abatement of the consequences of such an act can here come only 
from the executive. I cannot imagine any encroachment on the inviolability 
of the individual more dangerous than that such a palliation should be 
countenanced by the courts." At p. 447. 
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Not too much can be said about Salamon, except that it 
definitely shows the intransigence of Cartwright J. The majority 
judgment of Fauteux J.'" dismissed the appeal from conviction 
first, because there was no error in the charge about drunkenness 
and provocation and, second, because the defence of provocation 
was unavailable to the accused as the aggressor. Locke J. says the 
same thing in a concurring opinion. Cartwright J. after belabour-
ing the charge in order to find a technical error, orders a new trial 
without even mentioning the obvious problem of law which was 
one of the main bases of the majority. A very good argument 
could be made that one ought not to require a wrongful act of 
the deceasedm.. to justify use of provocation for mitigation, but 
the legislature has enacted that this is required. A defensible 
argument might be made that even this legislative demand does 
not exclude original or continuing aggression by the accused which 
provoked the victim's wrongful act. The defendant can still have 
lost control over his emotions and behaviour and perhaps warrants 
the mitigation provided by the defence. It should be obvious, 
though, that the argument must be made. 
The final case, Wright,'6 6 is treated by the court as raising 
a very narrow and very obvious point. Fauteux J.' ordered a new 
trial after an acquittal on the grounds of the judge's failure to in-
form the jury of the "objective" character of the first test. He 
should tell the jury that the defendant's character, background, 
temperament, idiosyncracies, or drunkenness, are all irrelevant 
as a matter of law to first test. All of this is very easy and author-
itative, established in the precedents, and it is a wonder that the 
trial judge missed it. On the other hand, there are grave difficulties 
in the logic of a purely objective test which pays no attention to 
the subjective characteristics of the accused. Fauteux J. does here 
cite a passage from Bedder"8 which shows how the notion of a 
standard, excluding a purely blind rage, requires some form of 
objective test. However, he leaves the desirability of this English 
standard completely unexplained and seems totally unaware of 
how severely it has been criticized. Moreover, as can be seen from 
its great elaboration in negligence, the "reasonable man" acts in a 
context which must share many of the characteristics of the de-
fendant in order that it be meaningful.'6 9 If the subjective knowl-
edge of the accused is relevant,' why not other features, such 
164 Taschereau, Abbott, Martland, and Judson JJ. concurring. 
'6 Actual or apparent, as is shown in R. v. Manchuk, supra, foot-
note 153. 166 Supra, footnote 16. 
167 Judson, Ritchie, Hall, and Pigeon JJ. concurring. 
16 Supra, footnote 152. 
169 One might compare the sophisticated treatment of the analogous 
problem in tort law in Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective (1927), 
41 Harv. L. Rev. 1. 
170 As it was in Manchuk, supra, footnote 153. 
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as his relationship with the victim (which is apparently excluded 
by Wright)? One cannot evaluate, or even talk sensibly about, a 
wrongful act or insult without viewing it in a situation. The court 
missed a real opportunity to begin the difficult task of drawing lines 
between the permissible subjective features of the "ordinary man", 
and those which are to be excluded. " 
Wright is an interesting development for two reasons. First, 
the decision is unanimous against the accused, the first in this 
area. Second, Cartwright J. does not sit, also a first, and perhaps 
the explanation for the former proposition. Each of these pre-
cedents was duplicated in Carker,'72the only decision in the period 
raising the issue of duress. The defendant lost unanimously in an 
opinion of Ritchie J."' which reversed the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal's reversal of his conviction. The defendant was charged 
with damaging public property, the plumbing fixtures in his cell, 
during a prison riot and proposed to prove both that he had been 
threatened with a knife in the back if he refused to join in and 
also that the background in this prison made the threat credible. 
The Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge's ruling that this 
evidence was irrelevant because it could not amount to a defence 
under section 17 of the Code. 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal had disagreed with the 
trial judge for three reasons: first, it might fulfill the requirements 
of section 17; second, if it did not, the section is not an exhaustive 
definition of the common law defence of duress which attempts 
to implement the policy of the criminal law that prohibited con-
duct must be fully free and voluntary; third, the requirement that 
the specific offence be committed "wilfully" might be negatived by 
this evidence even if it did not satisfy a general defence of duress. 
One can suspect that the court's view of the case was heightened 
by the fact that the defendant received a one-year jail term from 
the trial judge who had rejected the evidence. 
The Supreme Court's response to these arguments was very 
sparsely reasoned, although each of its conclusions is quite plausi-
ble. The third argument about the relevance of the term "wilfully" 
was wrong because it was defined by section 371(1) as including 
the accused's knowledge that his acts will probably cause damage. 
However, the court did not cite its own Dunbar" decision which 
"I One might compare the definition for the defence stated by the Model 
Penal Code, s. 201.3: 
"(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaugher when: ... (b) a homi-
cide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse 
shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation 
under the circumstances as he believes them to be." 
172 (1967), 2 C.C.C. 190 (S.C.C.). 
us Taschereau C.J., Fauteux, and Martland JJ. concurring. 
" (1936), 67 C.C.C. 20 (S.C.C.). 
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had already held that evidence of duress affected only the motive 
which led to prohibited conduct and would not exclude intentional 
awareness of the commission of the offence. Hence the court dis-
missed a chance to clarify the precise character of duress as an 
excuse which affects our ability to choose and not our intellectual 
awareness of the fact we are choosing to disobey the criminal 
law."7 
As regards the interpretation of section 17, probably the court 
was right in holding there was no threat of immediate harm by a 
person who was present when the offence was committed by the 
accused. The latter was in a locked cell here and the anonymous 
threat, however realistic it was, could only be implemented some 
time in the future. The court was able to distinguish the Subra-
manian case,"' relied on by the Court of Appeal, both on the 
facts and by the language of the relevant provisions. Unfortunately, 
again the court proceeds on the narrowest and most legalistic 
grounds. It does not advert at all to the obvious purposes of the 
statutory language which is to deny the excuse where it is possible 
to inform the legal authorities in the interim and thus require that 
the actor take the risk that their protection will be successful. 
Only in the light of such a purposive elaboration of the section 
will the decision give successful guidance to lower courts in dif-
ferent fact situations. 
The most significant facet of the opinion is Ritchie J.'s bold 
assumption that section 17 codifies and exhaustively defines the 
common law rules and principles respecting a legal defence of 
duress. He does not even advert to the possibility that the court 
can and should have a role under section 7 of the Code in de-
veloping this defence further in the light of its purposes and those of 
the related justification of "necessity". If we view the common law 
as a process of rational elaboration of basic legal principles, and 
not simply as a static collection of specific legal rules, it would 
not appear totally implausible to hold that the process of common 
law development under section 7 can still continue even after the 
legislature has intervened under section 17 to give a certain degree 
of assured protection to an accused."' Especially in the light of the 
demonstrated inadequacies of the section 17 formulation in im-
plementing the logic of the basic principle of criminal blame-
worthiness,"' it is doubly unfortunate that the issue was not con-
17 Which would have required that it deal with the important later 
English case of R. v. Steane, [1947] 1 K.B. 997 (C.C.A.). 
"' Subramanianv. Public Prosecutor, [1956] 1 W.L.R. 965. 
"' The drafting history of the section is quite consistent with this point 
of view; see Coolican, Comment (1967), 5 Osgoode Hall L.J. 78. 
17 As good an alternative definition as any is the Model Penal Code 
effort in s. 2.09: 
(1)It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct 
charged to constitute an offence because he was coerced to do so by the 
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sidered worthy of argument in the Carker opinion." 
IV. Legal Reasoning and the Supreme Court. 
I hope it is apparent from the foregoing analysis that the personal 
attitudes and reasoning styles of our Supreme Court judges do play 
a paramount role in determining the results of the cases they 
decide. The behavioural analyses indicated that some of the 
judges, at least, were primarily influenced by their attitudes to 
the substantive issues before them. Moreover, these same judges,
Cartwright and Fauteux JJ., tended to participate in more of these 
cases, to write more of the judgments in them, and to attract more 
concurrences in their opinions. Though they were, on occasion, 
willing to respect a binding precedent recently decided, the 
necessity for this was rare. It is fair to say that, in every area of 
our concern-strict liability, degrees of mens rea, mistake of law, 
drunkenness, provocation, constructive murder and duress-the 
basic decisions were made in this period, by this court, and with-
out it being, or seeing itself to be, bound to decide one way or the 
other. It had choices to be made and it made them, largely in 
accordance with the attitudes of one of its two influential and 
partisan contenders in the area. 
I assume, then, that the court here, as indeed anywhere in its 
work, is rarely totally confined by an easy-to-recognize, authorita-
tive, legal rule. These rules may shape and control the boundaries 
of decision and they may furnish the criteria which indicate how 
the court should solve the difficult problems with which it is left. 
However, they do not objectively and impersonally and obviously 
determine the final legal rule the court produces. We have seen 
how significant are the attitudes of both the partisans and the 
"swing" men on the court in influencing these conclusions and we 
have also seen something of the substantive content of the rules 
produced. What I propose now is to gather together all of the 
use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person
of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would 
have been unable to resist. 
(2) The defense provided by this section is unavailable if the actor 
recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he 
would be subjected to duress. The defence is also unavailable if he was 
negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever negligence suffices 
to establish culpability for the offense charged.
(3) It is not a defense that a woman acted on the command of her 
husband, unless she acted under such coercion as would establish a defense 
under this section. [The presumption that a woman, acting in the presence
of her husband, is coerced is abolished.]
(4) When the conduct of the actor would otherwise be justifiable under 
section 3.02, this section does not preclude such defense. 
m7Supra, footnote 172. Under facts quite analogous to the convictions 
in Dunbar and Carker, the common law principle of duress was used to 
excuse the defendant in A.-G. v. Whelan, [1934] Irish Rep. 518 (C.C.A.). 
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evidence available in this area of its work so as to portray the 
process of legal reasoning which mediates between attitude and 
product. 
The most evident dimension for analysis is the quality of 
the judges as lawyers. A compelling conclusion in this regard is 
that the court is little interested in or concerned with general legal 
questions. In many cases it totally disregards important general 
questions of legal principle in order to concentrate on the mani-
pulation of the facts (or the jury charge) in the particular case.' 
Even where it does see the necessity of adverting to the general 
problem, it rarely feels the question worth any lengthy detailed 
analysis. The most immediate evidence for this last proposition is 
the length of judgment which is devoted to the general issue. We 
might compare the Ontario Court of Appeal judgment in Binus 
with that of either Cartwright or Judson JJ., the several British 
Columbia Court of Appeal judgments in the intoxication area 
with those of Fauteux and Ritchie JJ. in George, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal opinions in King with those of Taschereau and 
Ritchie JJ., or even the dissent of Fauteux J. in More with the 
majority judgment of Cartwright J. In each case, the former per-
ceives a real legal problem, worthy of extensive intellectual grap-
pling. The latter judgments perceive and explicitly advert to the 
same problem but they assume that the answer is obvious and really 
worthy of no more than the statement of a conclusion. The one 
judge on the court who is rarely in the latter category is Fauteux J. 
As a result, the Supreme Court customarily ignores all, or 
almost all, of the relevant precedents in an .area. Perhaps the best 
way of realizing that a problem is complex is to be made aware of 
the variety of decisions in different jurisdictions-in Canada, 
England, Australia, the United States, to name only those with 
the same legal tradition as our own-and thus to see that alterna-
tive answers are possible because different courts have gone in 
different directions. Our court never cites American or Australian 
precedents in this area, does not feel bound by lower court Cana-
dian decisions'' nor by English decisions.'" Interestingly enough 
the same attitude carries over to its own precedents which it often 
fails to cite though theoretically it is bound by them. Perhaps 
its attitude to its earlier precedents is a function of its lack of 
concern for the legal value of the decisions it is making."' 
When the court does rely on a precedent, again it has a 
distinctive style in its approach. Customarily it picks a passage 
180 E.g., Bradley, supra, footnote 121, Shymkowich, supra, footnote 21. 
18' E.g., Morelli in Beaver, supra, footnote 34. 
1e2 E.g., the provocation cases. 
18 Its view of precedent in the Mann, supra, footnote 53, Binus, supra, 
footnote 11 and Peda, supra, footnote 114, sequence is perhaps the epitome 
of this attitude. 
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out of the opinion, without regard to its context, and uses this 
as the statement of a general legal rule to be applied in the instant 
case. Perhaps the classic instance of this is the adoption of the 
passage from Beard in George, but the same is true in Beaver, 
Watts and Gaunt, and so on. The court is rarely aware of the 
ambiguity of such general language-of how it takes on colour 
and greater clarity from the factual situation and the rest of the 
opinion. A classic instance of this is the use of Cartwright J.'s 
language in More by Spence J. in Mitchell, to extend the reach 
of the former rule far beyond what Cartwright J. says, in Mitchell, 
that he intended. Yet Cartwright J. himself is one of the great 
offenders in this regard, perhaps most flagrantly in his use of the 
passage from Loiselle in the very different Mann context. One of 
the few good analyses, and then distinguishing of, precedent occurs 
in the provocation cases where the common law precedents are not 
considered decisive in interpreting our statute. 
The court's attitude towards the authority of these legal 
sources, especially textual, is much the same. The court never uses 
Canadian periodical writings,"' only twice refers to American 
texts" and really uses only two English texts, Williams on Criminal 
Law'" and Turner's edition of Kenny.' These it uses as it does 
precedents, as the source of an authoritative passage stating a 
rule, not as a reference for the authority of a rule which it states 
itself. It never cites these texts to show that alternatives are 
available in the common law, or as the source of arguments 
favouring one alternative as more desirable and compatible with 
principle than another. 
Finally, the court is very deficient in making analytical distinc-
tions and then clarifying the meaning of the rules which it pro-
poses to adopt and use. The very important question of mens rea 
and unreasonable mistake of fact has been left totally confused by 
the efforts of Cartwright J.,"' Estey J.'" and Ritchie J."' I am not 
here criticizing the fact of disagreement since, obviously, there is 
room for it on such a basic issue. However, none of the judges 
seems to realize that there is a distinction here, that there are 
115 Fauteux J. refers to Weihofen, op. cit., footnote 134, in More, 
supra, footnote 19, and Ritchie J. to Holmes in King, supra, footnote 12. 
L.Q. 27, 407. It was not mentioned in any of the Supreme Court cases in 
the driving area and I find it impossible to believe that consideration of 
this work would not have enhanced the quality of reasoning in these de-
cisions. 
185 Fauteux J. refers to Weihofen, op. cit., footnote 134, in More, 
supra, footnote 19, and Ritchie J. to Holmes in King, supra, footnote 12. 
.86 Op. cit., footnote 27. 
m Op. cit., footnote 78. 
"18In Rees, supra, footnote 18 and Beaver, supra, footnote 31. 
189 In Watts and Gaunt, supra, footnote 30 and Shymkowich, supra, 
footnote 21. 
.. In King, supra, footnote 12. 
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others who disagree, and that it is necessary to make an argument 
in favour of the position that he adopts. Similarly, the court does 
not ever explicitly deal with the distinction between voluntary 
act and intentionm.. or the distinction between intention as to con-
sequences and mistake as to circumstances.." though these have 
long been current in the literature, including writers such as 
Williams and Turner whom the court often does cite. 
All in all, the court, at least in this area of the law, does not 
appear to fare too well in an assessment of its "legal" ability, 
except for Fauteux J. It might be argued that this is not too im-
portant since the inevitable "openness" of the issues which reach 
it demands more the quality of statemanship, awareness of 
practical consequences, and intelligence of attitude for their ade-
quate resolution. Hence the second dimension for our evaluation of 
the court, both from its opinions and from its results, concerns its 
performance as a developer of criminal law policy. 
It is apparent from its opinions that the court does not see it-
self as a purely passive instrument of positive law. Quite often it 
adverts to the specific consequences or the relevant practical 
factors in its decisions. This is most often true of Fauteux J."e' 
and occasionally of Cartwright J. 1' or Rand J.' However, even 
Fauteux J.'s efforts seem, upon reflection, to be lacking in per-
suasiveness, however much an improvement they are on his 
fellow judges. 
There are several reasons for this. First, the court never seems 
to realize, consciously, that it has an independent law-making 
role to play in this whole area. It is obvious that the court is 
making policy in this area, and that judicial attitudes are signifi-
cantly affecting the policies that result. However, the court never 
expresses awareness of these facts. Only rarely does it speak of 
section 7(2) and the preservation of the common law, or the 
failure of the legislature (especially outside the Code) to speak 
to the issues of mens rea. It does not draw the inference that these 
gaps necessarily require that it play a collaborative role in de-
veloping our criminal law."' 
Because the court sees no general role for itself in this area, the 
obvious corollary is that it has articulated no general philosophy 
about what the doctrines of mens rea shall be like. There are only 
faint hints of the reasons for the doctrinal protection of mens rea 
(usually in quotations from English judges) and only slightly 
191 Though it was raised directly by King, supra, footnote 12 and Bleta, 
supra, footnote 40. 
192 Which was so important to the drunkenness issue. 
"I See his opinions in Rees, supra, footnote 18, Beaver, supra, footnote 
31, More, supra, footnote 19 and the provocation cases. 
* As in Rees and Beaver, ibid. 
* In Tripodi, supra, footnote 158. 
19 Carker, supra, footnote 172, amply demonstrates this. 
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more explicit are the competing reasons for excluding it in specific 
cases, wholly or in part. There is some verbal attachment to the 
notion of legislative purpose (especially by Fauteux J.) but rarely 
does even Fauteux J. come to grips with what the legislative pur-
pose likely is,"' or why it might require limitation of mens rea."' 
Never once, in any one of these twenty-four cases, do the judges try 
to look at the sense or purpose of the precedent which they cite. 
The court often blindly follows passages extracted from opinions or 
texts and just as often totally ignores relevant precedents of the 
same authority as the former. What they do not do, though, is 
to search in a precedent (or a series of them) for a rule with prac-
tical significance for a type-situation, one which they choose to 
follow for this reason. 
In my opinion, perhaps the greatest deficiency in the court's 
activity as a policy maker, is its failure to see the area as an inte-
grated whole. The court does not perceive that the various doctrinal 
areas I have discussed compose a family of related problems, 
with several strands or themes of principle running throughout. 
As a result, the court never once cites a case in one doctrinal area 
as a relevant aid in resolving problems which arise in another con-
ceptually distinct area. 
What are the consequences of this? A court does not have the 
facilities to make law in the comprehensive "all-at-once" frame-
work available to a legislature. Instead it proceeds piece by piece, 
step by step, as different cases come before it. Yet the incidence of 
litigation can never bring many cases within a very specific 
area before the court over even an extended period of time. As 
a result, judicial law-making in an adversary prdcess is apt to be 
disjointed, unreasoned, and incoherent, as a court deals only with 
a very specific question whose immediate boundaries limit what 
the court sees as significant in the problems. 
Yet there is a remedy for these deficiencies which enables a 
court to take advantage of its peculiar position as an adjudicator 
of specific practical disputes in order to build, in an incremental 
fashion, a coherent rational body of law. This remedy is the 
technique of seeing in each specific case an instance of a general 
principle, a practical test of a more or less philosophical theory 
of the competing values which the whole area of law ought to 
protect. Within such a framework the reasons which are given for 
deciding whether a particular crime requires mens rea are vitally 
important for deciding which of the various alternative forms of 
mens rea should be preferred (and vice versa). Arguments from 
each of these areas are of prime significance in determining what 
197 As I suggested in discussing More, supra, footnote 19. 
"' As he advocated in Rees, supra, footnote 18 and Beaver, supra, 
footnote 31; compare R. v. Lim Chin Aik, supra, footnote 70. 
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the court should do about such distinctive questions as duress, 
provocation, automatism, and intoxication. Each instance of the 
latter enables the court to see a new facet of the whole problem, 
to re-examine as much as is necessary the developing philosophy 
of mens rea as a whole, and to test the desirability of the apparent 
direction of this philosophy by its application to a concrete issue. 
Such a theory of judicial policy-making requires the court to 
see that judges have an independent role to play, one for which 
their institutional characteristics fit them better than any other 
body. Such a role requires that they think about the real, practi-
cal consequences of what they are doing and ask whether this is 
really what they ought to be doing. Because this process is explicit, 
it is conducive to the development of a shared principle, in whose 
articulation many members of the court collaborate over a period 
of time-indeed many courts over this period of time-a principle 
which is founded on reasons which are open to criticism and 
change and which is tested and evaluated in all of the concrete 
situations to which it is relevant. 
Of course, this is an ideal which I have stated for the judicial 
process, and every court must fall short of it to some extent in its 
performance. Unfortunately, it is apparent that our Supreme Court 
does not perceive at all that this is the ideal to which it should 
strive and thus, of necessity, it must fall far short of even what it is 
capable of doing. By and large, the court does not see major legal 
questions involved in the cases before it and does not see that 
the general issues it deals with are complex and difficult. The 
court proceeds as if the decisions were already made for it, by 
the legislature or by courts, though perhaps the answers are stated 
in texts. This is indeed paradoxical since the decisions have not 
been made, and the attitudes of the judges determine the results 
they themselves produce. But it is a fact that the court believes it 
does not choose, and that it acts on this belief, and that this also 
determines, in as important a way as the substantive attitudes 
themselves, the products of Supreme Court decision-making. 
When we look at the court as a policy-making or law-develop-
ing body, we cannot really hold the significance of this effort to 
be exhausted in the votes of the judges in the cases before them. 
Very few criminal law cases come to court, few of those which go 
to court are contested, even fewer of these are appealed, and only 
an infinitesimal minority reach the Supreme Court. If the court 
is to play an important role as a national law-maker, it cannot 
rely on the specific decisions it makes in its own cases as any index 
of its effectiveness. Rather, it must formulate general standards 
which all of the other decision-makers in the process, especially 
the lower court judges, are able and willing to follow themselves. 
It is on this dimension that the court has failed most dismally. 
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As we have seen, the court has often limited its focus to the 
specific facts of individual cases, rather than the general legal 
question these cases raise. It does not try clearly to formulate 
a precise legal rule, to have the majority of the judges in a case 
join in an opinion which accepts this rule as the minimum basis for 
the decision,19 9 to set this rule in the context of developing prece-
dents in this field, and then to re-use and build upon it in sub-
sequent cases. The court has not tried to formulate general direc-
tive principles and establish them in Canadian law, with explicit 
reference to their justifying reasons. 
As a result, the most paradoxical conclusion of this whole 
study is that the Supreme Court has had very little influence on the 
course of Canadian law in this area. This is extremely strange if 
our assumptions are correct (1) that the court in this period has 
spoken to almost every major question of mens rea not just once, 
but several times; (2) that the previous law left much of these 
issues quite open to judicial innovation; (3) that the court itself 
chose to innovate in accordance with preponderant judicial atti-
tudes, and (4) that there is no evidence of lower court unwilling-
ness to accept the results of the Supreme Court's value attitudes. 
It is hard to believe that the results of this twenty years of effort, 
and twenty-five or so major decisions, has had little or no in-
dependent impact on our Canadian law. Yet the conclusion ap-
pears inescapable. 
The decisions on fault versus strict liability are sometimes 
mentioned, sometimes not: followed in one direction by one 
court, in another direction by another court. Sherrasv. De Rutzeno' 
is much more important than Rees, Beaver, or King. The decisions 
on mistake of law are not only not influential, they are rarely 
mentioned. The real decision on the presumption of intent is that 
of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Gianotti.2" Drunkenness is still 
governed by Beard (though somewhat muddied by George), while 
Bleta is a non-decision as regards automatism. The court did not 
really say anything more than the statute in the constructive 
murder area (except in Rowe), and what it did say as to the 
problem of degrees of mens rea in driving offences has been im-
possible for anyone to follow. There are exceptions to all of this, 
here as elsewhere, in the provocation area where the court does 
seem to have adopted a policy, formulated a rule to implement it, 
given the reasons for the rule, followed the rule themselves, and 
seen it influence lower court decisions substantially. This last 
exception, though, proves by contrast the general comments 
' This failing is most graphically demonstrated in the Mann-Binus-
Peda sequence which has caused Laskin J.A., perhaps the most perceptive 
Canadian judge, to fail twice in trying to follow the court's tortuous path. 
200 Supra, footnote 49. 
2O1 Supra, footnote 123. 
I 
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would make about the court's efforts in the whole area of mens rea. 
Conclusion 
As I have cautioned several times in the course of this article, we 
must be careful about attributing too much significance to the 
patterns of behaviour which appear in this small sample of the 
court's work. If this is true, then, we must be doubly cautious 
about the validity of any speculation which seeks to explain these 
patterns. In the face of these warnings, though, I would suggest 
certain tentative hypotheses whose adequacy will be tested in 
future treatment in the same way as other samples of the court's 
decision-making. 
In an earlier article2 02 I have suggested that judicial decision-' 
making at the appellate court level can be understood on a dimen-
sion which ranges from "adjudication" through to "policy-making". 
By this I mean that courts can conceive of their role as primarily 
oriented either to the adjudication of individual disputes or to 
the setting of general policies for the society. The Supreme Court 
appears to me to be at the extreme end of the adjudication side 
of this spectrum. It obviously does not concern itself explicitly 
with policy considerations which might influence creative innova-
tions that it could make in our law. However, it does not even 
feel it important to state clearly the legal rules and principles 
which it feels are part of our law and which it applies to the 
immediate case. Instead, the thrust of its activity appears to 
consist in the settlement of concrete disputes as they come before 
it, with little or no regard to the general type problem each 
appears to present. 
If this orientation in our Supreme Court does in fact obtain, it 
raises several serious questions, both as to why it has so developed 
and also as to the constitutional significance it has. As regards the 
first, we can speculate about the jurisdiction of the court, especially 
the appeal as of right above a certain monetary amount. As 
regards the second, we might wonder about the value of a second 
appeal for purposes of doing justice in a concrete dispute. Do 
we need a national Supreme Court if it does not conceive of its 
primary functions as the clarification and elaboration of our legal 
systems in the light of basic principles and community values? 
Should a court with the orientation that ours appears to have, be 
given the task of administering an entrenched Bill of Rights 
which controls either federal or provincial legislative power? These 
are vitally important questions but I would not pretend to deal 
with them until a later time and with further documentation. 
202 Op. cit., footnote 3. 
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EPILOGUE 
The research for and writing of this article was basically com-
pleted in the early fall of 1969. The period under review, then, 
was from 1949 to the middle of 1969. Since then two further 
interesting cases have appeared in the reports dealing with the 
general problem of mens rea and the criminal defences. Rather 
than incorporate them into the body of the article and rework 
the latter, I thought it would be interesting to treat them as 
subsequent data with which some of the emerging hypotheses might 
be tested. 
The details of one of these cases, R. v. Peda" have been 
recounted earlier, as the last in the sequence dealing with the 
degrees of blameworthiness in driving offences. The second case, 
R. v. Borg,2 " deals with the problem of the defence of insanity, 
the only such case to reach the court in this whole period. More-
over, it is concerned with the most critical problem in this whole 
defence, to wit, the extent to which the legal definitions of in-
sanity incorporated in section 16 of the Code could be stretched 
to embrace our deepening psychological understanding. At the 
time the McNaghten rules were first established, it appeared ap-
propriate to conceive of mental disability in purely intellectual 
terms, but over a hundred years of debate have amply demon-
strated this no longer to be true. The McRuer Royal Commission 
suggested that certain subtle variations in the language of our 
Code, especially the use of the word "appreciate", gave legal 
warrant to a wider view of mental disability, embracing such 
categories as neuroses or psychopaths."' Borg was the first case to 
ask the Supreme Court if this, indeed, were true. 
If we look at this problem in terms of basic principle, then 
a strong presumption should operate in favour of extension of the 
insanity defence. The whole point of mens rea as a requirement of 
criminal guilt is that the defendant has chosen to commit an 
offence or, at least, that he has been able to choose not to do so. 
Although such an ability to choose can be affected indirectly 
by lack of knowledge, it also can directly be rendered inoperative. 
We recognize this fact in a more or less limited fashion in the 
defences of duress, necessity, or provocation. If modern psychol-
ogy tells us that psychic disability can function primarily with 
respect to our control over our decisions and actions, then the 
reasons behind the insanity defence demand its extension. Yet this 
203 Supra, footnote 114. 
20 (1969), 4 C.C.C. 262. 
205 Report of Royal Commission on the Law of Insanity as a Defence 
in Criminal Cases (Ottawa, 1956), pp. 11-12. Probably the same interpre-
tation is defensible even under the old M'Naghten Rules. See People V. 
Wolfl (1964), 394 P.2d 959; Goldstein, The Insanity Defence (1967). 
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is peculiarly an area where the practical considerations inherent in 
the administration of a criminal justice system may require limita-
tion on the logic of blameworthiness. We may be very doubtful 
about the claims of modern psychiatry to isolate a mental defect 
which leaves our reasoning powers unimpaired. Some psychiatrists 
have seemed to suggest that the very fact of criminal behaviour is 
a sufficient reason for inferring the existence of some sociopathic 
disability. The qualms these claims create may become particularly 
important at the level of a jury trial where we ask the layman 
to distinguish between an impulse which was not resisted and an 
impulse which could not be resisted. The interpretation of section 
16 in Borg logically involved some reference to these competing 
considerations which have been so much discussed in recent 
literature and case law. 
Borg had killed a R.C.M.P. policeman as well as two women. 
He had purchased a rifle and called the R.C.M.P. to come to 
his home before opening fire. His only defence was insanity. 
Although the Alberta Court of Appeal was divided in reversing 
a conviction for capital murder, it was unanimous in accepting 
the legitimacy of a possible insanity verdict from the jury. The 
only question which either of their opinions dealt with was the 
adequacy of the judge's charge in raising the issue of legal in-
sanity for the jury and explaining the possible ways in which the 
evidence might support the defence. The majority. opinion of 
the Supreme Court, written by Caitwright J., held that the ade-
quacy of the judge's charge was irrelevant because insanity could 
not be a defence here. 
Amazingly enough, the opinion does not indicate clearly 
whether this is because the mental disability was insufficient in 
law or because there was inadequate proof that the disability in 
fact was operative at the time of the killing. Either interpreta-
tion of the opinion appears defensible to this reader206 and it is 
206 The essential passages in the Cartwright J.'s opinion (concurred in 
by Fauteux, Abbott, Martland, Judson, Ritchie and Pigeon JJ.) are the 
following. He quoted the critical passage in the jury charge: 
"Now I must tell you that at law a so-called irresistible or uncontrol-
lable impulse of itself is not a defence within the meaning of this Act un-
less that uncontrollable or irresistible movement or impulse stems from the 
existence of insanity as defined here, and when one looks to the reasonable 
rationality of it, it becomes so obvious why it is that a mere irresistible 
and uncontrollable impulse is not a defence. Because everybody would get 
such impulses with respect to any offence. The man who breaks a jeweller's 
window to steal a diamond, has an irresistible impulse to do it, and, there-
fore, is acquitted on the ground of insanity if one is guided by this mere 
proposition of irresistible impulse. It must be, as this section says, and I 
repeat it to you: 
'For the purpose of this section a person is insane when he is in a state 
of natural imbecility', 
now, there is no suggestion of that here-
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indeed astonishing that the court did not appreciate the importance 
of clarifying the basis of its conclusion. No legal authorities were 
cited at all with reference to the insanity issue. 
Nor could it be said that the court simply did not advert 
to the wider significance of this case. In a meticulous dissenting 
opinion, Hall J. who was joined by Spence J., not only went over 
the evidence and jury direction in some detail, but also spoke 
explicitly to the question noted earlier. Unlike the majority opin-
ion, he did cite some legal authorities, referring especially to the 
Brown case,"o' which allowed a limited use to medical testimony 
about irresistible impulse as evidence of a "disease of the mind". 
More important, although he did not mention the McRuer Royal 
'or has disease of the mind to an extent that renders him incapable of 
appreciating the nature and quality of an act or omission or of knowing 
that an act or omission is wrong.' . . ." 
(At pp. 277-278 of the Supreme Court decision.) 
He then recited the most favourable view of the psychiatric evidence 
from the point of view of the accused: 
"(i) that Borg was suffering from a disease of the mind called a psycho-
pathic state and that he fitted into the classification of the aggressive, 
anti-social, impulse-ridden type of personality; (ii) that he had very few 
healthy coping mechanisms or ways of defending himself against im-
pulses such a homicidal or sexual ones; (iii) that this lack of impulse 
control is chronic; (iv) that a major characteristic of this impulse type 
of personality is being emotionally unbalanced by the illness, that the 
moral issues cannot be differentiated, that he does not have the moral 
ethical part of his mind functioning most of his life but 'most im-
portant of all he can have normal cognitive functioning', (v) that the 
impulse is so powerful his judgment is impaired but he can still have 
intellectual functioning, (vi) that the effect of alcohol is unpredictable; 
it can wipe away any controls or it might even calm him; it is impos-
sible to say, (vii) that Borg hates authoritarian figures and under the 
influence of his anti-social impulse driven, aggressive impulses, he can 
kill, (viii) that if the force of the impulse cannot be resisted 'at that 
moment', and this is a symptom of what he suffers from-an impulse 
-psychotic state-an irresistible impulse when he neither reasons nor 
deliberates, (ix) that the irrestible impulse is both a symptom of the 
disease of the mind and the disease itself, (x) that he operates some-
times with normal intellect, sometimes with a little better than normal 
intellect, and sometimes like a little boy." 
(At pp. 269-270.) 
The substance of his disposition of the case is expressed in the following 
passage: 
"It appears to me that the effect of Dr. Spaner's evidence is that, in his 
opinion, at the time of the shooting Borg may have been acting under an 
irresistible impulse such as the doctor had described. There is no evidence 
that Borg himself had that view and the portions of his statements and of 
the answers read to the jury far from suggesting anything in the nature of 
an impulsive action indicate a careful and deliberate plan which it took him 
some hours to carry out. The actions and statements of Borg after the 
shooting indicate that he was well aware of what he had done and that 
it was wrong. The evidence taken as a whole falls far short of being
sufficient to satisfy the onus of proof on the balance of probabilities which 
rests on the defence when insanity is alleged." 
(At p. 270.) 
"0' A.-G. South Australia v. Brown, [1960] A.C. 432. 
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Commission, he did use the argument about the difference between 
section 16 of the Code and the McNaghten rules which inheres 
in the word "appreciate". The jury might have found that the im-
pulse affected the defendant's moral sense and that this precluded 
an appreciation of the nature and quality of the act. His opinion 
would offer substantial scope to the insanity defence, something 
which only a fictional view of McNaghten can ever do. The 
majority does not respond to this challenge. 
The case does raise a nice jurisprudential point. As noted 
earlier the 1956 Royal Commission recommended that there be no 
changes in section 16 because of a belief that our insanity defence 
could be given an expansive reading which would include legiti-
mate cases of true inability to control one's behaviour. A dis-
senting minority of the Commission had reservations about the 
legal defensibility of this confident interpretation of McRuer J. The 
minority explicitly said that if the Supreme Court of Canada 
gave a contrary and narrow interpretation to section 16, it should 
2 0 8 be amended. Should a court use as a reason for its conclusion 
this advice by a Royal Commission to the legislature which the 
latter appears to have relied upon? Whatever be the answer to this 
question, it is indeed unfortunate that the court has left us quite 
in the dark about whether section 16 does require amendment 
to keep it abreast of developing psychological knowledge. 
With this review of the Borg decision, what do these two 
cases confirm or refute in our earlier hypotheses? The most in-
triguing fact is the presence of Cartwright J. as the author of a 
decision in Borg in favour of the Crown and against the defendant 
in this area, and this is a hotly contested case where the lower 
court was reversed. In fact, this may well be the best evidence 
there is that the narrower factual theory for the Borg majority 
opinion is correct. If judicial behaviouralism ever became a legiti-
mate technique in interpreting precedents, this might be a good 
place to use it. Other than this anomaly, all other votes were 
predictable with Hall and Spence JJ. dissenting in Borg, and Cart-
wright, Hall and Spence JJ. dissenting together in Peda. The blocs 
hold together and it is noteworthy that the mens rea position is 
continuing to lose ground. 
When we turn away from substantive attitudes and look at 
the process of legal reasoning, divergences also appear. In Borg, 
the majority opinion cites no authorities and simply ducks the 
important questions. The dissent cites two cases and the statute, 
but only to reach conclusions, with no discussion of either their 
desirability or how they might be applied with any real signi-
ficance. In Peda, on the other hand, the opinions do deal in some 
208 McRuer Report, op. cit., footnote 205, p. 48 et seq. 
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detail with the relevant authorities in the court's own precedents, 
O'Grady, Mann and Binus. Each opinion-writer spells out the 
reasons why he feels legally justified in reaching a certain result. 
However, as I stated earlier, the majority judgment of Judson J., 
which finds the question still open about the state of mind neces-
sary for "dangerous driving", still leaves us totally uninstructed 
in the reasons why his interpretation of the legislature's wishes is 
most sensible. 
Our general conclusions about the court's attitude towards its 
role are similarly confirmed. Not one of the five different opinions 
in these cases evinces even the slightest hint that the court realizes 
it is making law for Canadian society. There is not even a phrase 
which indicates a reason why the court might prefer one rule to 
another as a better means of implementing preferred values. To 
the extent that any opinion adverts to the question of which legal 
rule is to be authoritative, the whole process of argument is di-
rected to finding a rule in the authorities, statutory or decisional. It 
is especially ironic, then, that the only clearly established rule, 
that established by Binus, was the only authority treated as open 
to review. 
This lack of concern for policy is understandable though not 
justifiable in our positivist legal tradition. What is distinctive about 
the Supreme Court as an appellate body is its relative lack of 
concern for law-for either the formulation or clarification of the 
legal rules which it uses to decide cases. This is manifest in both 
majority opinions. We do not know whether Borg is decided on 
a narrow factual ground or as the result of a legal rule which 
defines the insanity defence in a new area. As the result of terribly 
unrealistic view of precedent, the court in Peda deprives us of a 
relatively established rule, and then fails to furnish a majority 
for any substitute when Ritchie J. joins in two contradictory 
opinions. 
As usual, the court is much more concerned with deciding 
the concrete, individual case, perhaps in the way it thinks best 
in the concrete situation. Only a very few such cases can get to 
this highest appellate court, though, and the court can only in-
fluence the course of decisions in the lower courts, if it states a 
rule which they are able to follow. No such rule has been supplied 
for each of these very important situations and thus each will have 
to return to the court at some time in the future. It is doubly un-
fortunate that the court's failure to think seriously about its role in 
each of these problem areas will deprive the subsequent court of 
any real consideration on which it might build. We have had 
three attempts at elaboration of the "dangerous driving" provision 
and the court has not even begun to consider the real issues it 
will raise. In this, as in almost every other respect, Peda and Borg 
1971]1 The Supreme Court of Canada 363 
confirm our findings about the work of the previous twenty 
years."' 
2o9 Some time after I completed this article, the Supreme Court of 
Canada decided the case of R. V. Trinneer, [1970] S.C.R. 638 which in 
effect over-ruled the cases of Cathro and Chow Bew, supra, footnotes 128-
129. This case also came from the British Columbia Court of Appeal, and 
the latter court followed the two earlier Supreme Court decisions (which had 
incidentally over-ruled the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Cathro),
in holding that reasonable foresight of death occurring in a joint robbery 
was necessary for the conviction of the one who did not himself inflict the 
bodily injury causing death. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion 
written by Cartwright C.J., reversed the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
and restored a conviction on the grounds that reasonable foresight of an 
injury was sufficient. This extension of the felony murder rule and conse-
quent restriction on the principle of mens rea was not linguistically re-
quired by the relevant sections, or so I believe, and was accomplished with 
little reference to the decided authorities or the implications for the 
criminal law process of the step the court was taking. The retreat from 
the mens rea principle is proceeding apace. Even more recently, the de-
cision in R. v. Pierce Fisheries, accentuated this trend by upholding a con-
viction under the federal Fisheries Act on the basis of strict liability. See 
supra, footnote 49. 
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